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LAW SCHOOL IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: LEGAL EDUCATION AS A 
WORK OF MERCY 
PAMELA A. WILKINS* 
[W]e live in complex and deeply challenging times. Our society most often 
measures the value of a person by his or her productivity alone and discards the 
unproductive along the way. 
We live in a society so mesmerized by its view of success that it considers real 
only that which can be touched, weighed, and measured, a culture in which 
human and spiritual values have almost vanished from its consciousness. 
Whether it is our brothers and sisters living on the streets in this city of such 
great power [Washington D.C.], or the tens of millions of persons around the 
globe who have become refugees because of both political and economic 
violence; today there is such devastating human suffering and dehumanization. 
The world’s most notable Jesuit has spoken powerfully about this very reality. 
Addressing the Fortune-Time Global Forum last December, Pope Francis 
affirmed the “urgent need for more inclusive and equitable economic models.” 
He has called for a “revolution of tenderness.” 
Today, more than ever, we need this “revolution of tenderness.” This may be a 
strange message given the prestige of Georgetown University. However, I ask 
you to consider that our hearts are becoming hard.  
Mary Scullion, May 20, 2017, Georgetown College (of 
Georgetown University) Commencement Address1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Sister Mary Scullion is a badass. Moved by a desire to alleviate suffering, 
she joined the Sisters of Mercy at age nineteen. One thing led to another, and 
pretty soon she found herself sleeping on the streets in solidarity with the 
 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Detroit Mercy School of Law. I would like to thank 
Sister Helen Marie Burns, RSM; Professor Linda Edwards, E.L. Cord Foundation Professor of Law 
(UNLV); and my Detroit Mercy colleagues Professor Andrew Moore and Professor Cara 
Cunningham Warren for reading and commenting upon earlier versions of this article. 
 1. The text of the Commencement Address may be found at Homeward: The Official Blog 
of Project Home, https://projecthome.org/posts/2017/05/sister-mary-georgetown-grads-begin-revo 
lution-tenderness [https://perma.cc/W4EL-U83X] (May 18, 2017). 
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homeless.2 This little act of solidarity—one week of wholly (holy!) voluntary 
homelessness—was “the hardest thing [Mary] ever did. [She returned] sick as a 
dog, really depleted.”3 Hard as it was, her little act of solidarity gave her great 
empathy for people on the streets. 
This empathy led to direct action and political advocacy. Her efforts have 
provided employment, education, healthcare, and housing (for more than 2,200 
people) to the chronically homeless, including homeless mentally ill women, in 
Philadelphia.4 She’s been recognized nationally and internationally.5 She’s even 
been arrested.6 
Dr. Margaret Farley is another badass. Of course she’s an intellectual badass 
with a formidable CV: Gilbert L. Stark Professor Emerita of Christian Ethics at 
Yale Divinity School; former president of both the Catholic Theological Society 
of America and the Society of Christian Ethics; prize-winning author of books 
and articles in the areas of medical and bioethics, feminist ethics, sexual ethics, 
and theological ethics; recipient of eleven honorary degrees.7 But her acclaim—
at times notoriety8—isn’t really the point. What’s remarkable is the flavor of her 
 
 2. See Meet Sister Mary Scullion (Modern Hero Prods. 2017), https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=Z1NndaZFyH0 [https://perma.cc/CU77-VPEL] (last accessed Aug. 18, 2018). Sisters of 
Mercy make annual retreats, and early in her days as a sister, Mary Scullion asked for her retreat 
to consist of a week on the streets. 
 3. See The Philadelphia Award, Sister Mary Scullion, RSM, http://philadelphiaaward.org/ 
sister-mary-scullion/ [https://perma.cc/3J4C-DLCZ] (last accessed Aug. 18, 2018) [hereinafter 
Sister Mary Scullion, RSM]. 
 4. Project Home, Leadership at Project Home, https://projecthome.org/about/leadership- 
project-home [https://perma.cc/7LAE-DMFA] (last accessed Aug. 18, 2018). 
 5. Id. 
 6. See Sister Mary Scullion, RSM, supra note 3. 
 7. Yale Divinity School, Margaret A. Farley, https://divinity.yale.edu/faculty-and-research/ 
yds-faculty/margaret-farley [https://perma.cc/RNB4-ZHRT] (last accessed Aug. 18, 2018). 
 8. Dr. Farley received the 2008 Grawemeyer Award in Religion for Just Love, her 
exploration of Christian sexual ethics. See http://grawemeyer.org/2008-margaret-farley/ 
[https://perma.cc/G9TN-2PHG] (last accessed Aug. 18, 2018). However, the book also received a 
Notification from the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, noting that it “affirms teachings 
that are in direct contradiction with Catholic teaching in the field of sexual morality.” See, e.g., 
BBC News, Vatican Critical of U.S. Nun’s Book on Sexual Ethics, https://www.bbc.com/news/ 
world-europe-18321830 [https://perma.cc/6Q5S-QNE7] (June 4, 2012) (describing Vatican’s 
criticism). Although she conceded that her work did not conform to current Catholic teaching on 
sexuality, Dr. Farley observed that the dispute actually reflected a dispute over the task of the 
theologian: 
The issue is, finally, in our tradition, is it a contradiction to have power settle questions of 
truth? Or to say we all have a capacity to know what we ought to do? We can make mistakes, 
we can disagree—but is it the case that natural law is let go when we really only know the 
answers because of grace of office? This is a profoundly important question in our tradition 
today. 
Joshua J. McElwee, Vatican-criticized Nun Addresses Fellow Theologians, Natl. Catholic Rptr. 
(June 10, 2012) (available at https://www.ncronline.org/news/spirituality/vatican-criticized-nun-
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work, which is characterized by a determination to include the experiences of 
women and of other once invisible persons in exploring age-old issues;9 by an 
openness to insights from a wide variety of disciplines and cultures;10 and by a 
concern for justice not simply in the abstract, but in the concrete reality of actual 
relationships.11 And the work is motivated by compassion: when asked why she 
tackled controversial issues in Just Love, she said simply, “My reasons for 
thinking it’s important for everyone to think about these issues is because people 
are suffering. All over the place, people are suffering.”12 
The two women are profoundly different—Mary Scullion is a quintessential 
activist, Margaret Farley a quintessential scholar—but they share the same 
spiritual DNA. They are both members of the Sisters of Mercy. And from this 
common charism arises a common commitment to a tough-minded and tender-
hearted mercy, with a special concern for women and girls. 
What might it mean for a law school to share this Mercy charism? More 
broadly, what would it mean for a law school to share the spiritual DNA of a 
female order, seeing the world from historically female perspectives and 
motivated by historically female concerns? More broadly still, in this #metoo13 
era, in which women make up the majority of American law students,14 should 
it simply be business as usual at religiously affiliated law schools, or should we 
seize the opportunity to consider seriously, and in the light of faith, women’s 
perspectives on legal education, law, and justice? 
This article is my attempt to grapple with these questions. My interest is, of 
course, personal. I am on the faculty at University of Detroit Mercy School of 
 
addresses-fellow-theologians?_ga=2.181445092.2145393972.1519430676-469135285.1519430 
676 [https://perma.cc/FL3P-P9ES]) (including excerpts from a speech by Dr. Farley to the Catholic 
Theological Society of America). 
 9. See, e.g., Margaret A. Farley, Just Love 17 (Continuum Intl. Publg. Group 2006) 
(“[E]thical theory regarding sex . . . has been predominantly theory formulated by an elite group of 
men in any given society. Women’s experiences, beliefs, values, are unrecorded and, until recently, 
almost wholly inaccessible. The same is true for men who do not belong to a dominant class.”). 
 10. See generally id. at Pts 3 & 4. 
 11. See, e.g., id. at 200 et seq. (“A love is right and good insofar as it aims to affirm truthfully 
the concrete reality of the beloved.”). 
 12. See McElwee, supra note 8 (quoting Dr. Farley’s speech to the Catholic Theological 
Society of America). 
 13. The me too movement was founded in 2006 by Tarana Burke, and its original purpose was 
to “help survivors of sexual violence, particularly Black women and girls, and other young women 
of color from low wealth communities, find pathways to healing.” https://metoomvmt.org/about 
/#history [https://perma.cc/UDW3-RZUF] (last accessed Apr. 14, 2019). In recent years, through 
the viral hashtag #metoo, “[w]hat started as local grassroots work has expanded to reach a global 
community of survivors from all walks of life and helped to de-stigmatize the act of surviving by 
highlighting the breadth and impact of sexual violence worldwide.” Id. 
 14. See Elizabeth Olson, Women Make Up Majority of U.S. Law Students for First Time, NY 
Times (Dec. 16, 2016) (available at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/16/business/dealbook/ 
women-majority-of-us-law-students-first-time.html [https://perma.cc/8YQ5-DUFL]). 
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Law. Our institution enjoys both a Jesuit and a Mercy identity.15 The Jesuit 
brand of legal education is well known and has its own distinctive flavor—of 
that, more later.16 But this school is the only Mercy law school in the United 
States and one of only two religiously affiliated law schools17 sponsored by a 
female order. What might legal education be like, especially at Detroit Mercy, 
if we took our Mercy identity seriously? As a faculty member, a feminist, and a 
Christian, I believe our Mercy identity presents an opportunity to reimagine and 
reinvigorate legal education and law in ways that extend well beyond the walls 
of my own institution. 
This article begins to imagine such an education. The preliminary sections 
examine the major sources that inform my vision for law school “in a different 
voice,”18 that is, for legal education in the Mercy tradition. Parts II through IV 
explore the life and values of Catherine McAuley, founder of the Sisters of 
Mercy; the current values, priorities, and educational mission of the Mercy 
Institute within the United States; and scholarship on Mercy identity in higher 
education. Part V turns to religiously affiliated law schools, with a special focus 
on Jesuit identity in legal education. Each of these sources constitutes a building 
block for Part VI. 
Part VI articulates my vision for legal education in the Mercy tradition. Such 
an education is defined by two special commitments: first, to mercifulness; 
second, to women and girls. Part VI explores what the two commitments mean 
within the context of legal education.  
Briefly put, the commitment to mercifulness requires that the education we 
provide helps students first to see and “interiorize[], absorb[] in the innards,”19 
the suffering of others, that is, to see the crucified peoples of our society and 
world. This education also should help students to react with well-informed 
mercy, “to do everything . . . possible to bring [the suffering] down from the 
 
 15. See http://law.udmercy.edu/about-us/history.php [https://perma.cc/SF8Q-NY66] (last 
accessed Aug. 18, 2018). The School of Law originally was part of the University of Detroit, a 
Jesuit university. In 1990, the University of Detroit merged with Mercy College, and since then, 
the Society of Jesus (Jesuits) and Sisters of Mercy have served as joint sponsors for the institution. 
See http://www.udmercy.edu/about/history.php [https://perma.cc/CNG3-7QZ6] (last accessed 
Aug. 18, 2018). 
 16. See infra Parts IV & V (discussing Jesuit universities and Jesuit legal education). 
 17. Barry University, which includes a law school, was founded by the Adrian Dominican 
sisters. See https://www.barry.edu/law/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/79ZS-6UTQ] (last accessed 
April 3, 2018). Unlike the Mercy congregation, which was founded by women, the Dominican 
order began as a male order and later expanded to women religious. 
 18. This term is borrowed from the title of Carol Gilligan’s groundbreaking book. See CAROL 
GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT 
(1982). 
 19. JON SOBRINO, THE PRINCIPLE OF MERCY: TAKING THE CRUCIFIED PEOPLE FROM THE 
CROSS 17 (Orbis Books 1994). 
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cross.”20 Work to bring crucified peoples down from the cross is justice work, 
but this urge to remedy injustice is motivated by mercy. How students work to 
alleviate suffering may vary—note the differences between Mary Scullion and 
Margaret Farley—but if human suffering is invisible to them or if they are 
indifferent to it, we have failed. Part VI describes, inter alia, how the law school 
curriculum might more effectively form lawyers who will be governed by a 
principle of mercy. 
The commitment to women and girls is related to the commitment to 
mercifulness. It begins with the recognition that women and girls sometimes 
have been among the crucified peoples, and that our legal system has all too 
often aided and abetted the crucifiers. (To a degree, this is true even within the 
legal academy.) Thus, this commitment to women and girls requires that we help 
students understand and question many of the assumptions underlying American 
law, and examine whether such assumptions have harmed women and girls, not 
to mention any number of other vulnerable groups. I am thinking in particular 
of the radically individualistic conception of the human person that undergirds 
all too much of American law and of our perceptions of justice—a conception 
of the human person inconsistent with both feminist and Christian thought.21 
The commitment also requires work on behalf of women and girls. Finally, it 
also suggests working to replace the highly individualistic values prevalent 
within the law school culture itself with an ethos that prioritizes community. 
A law school defined by core, spirit-meets-the-bone commitments to 
mercifulness and to women and girls would be a prophetic presence even among 
religiously affiliated law schools. Indeed, a deep commitment to a principle of 
mercy—to seeing and identifying the crucified, to taking them down from the 
cross—unmasks and confronts the idolatries that afflict legal education, 
especially the golden calf of status obsession. An institution embodying these 
commitments would be badass in the best sense: as fierce and tender as Mary 
Scullion; as intellectually disciplined and open to a variety of perspectives as 
Margaret Farley; as committed to women, the vulnerable, and justice as right 
relationship as both Scullion and Farley. 
Let us begin. 
II.  CATHERINE MCAULEY AND THE HOUSE OF MERCY 
The first source for this vision of legal education is the life of the woman 
who founded the Sisters of Mercy. 
The Mercy congregation could only have been born of a woman. A wealthy 
woman’s troubled midlife dreams of orphan children and destitute females gave 
birth first to the House of Mercy, a home dedicated to caring for and empowering 
poor women and children through education and job training; then to the Mercy 
 
 20. Id. at 10. 
 21. See infra Part VI.B. 
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congregation itself, which carried this mission of care and empowerment 
throughout the world. 
Catherine McAuley was that wealthy dreamer who went on to found the 
Sisters of Mercy.22 Yet even as her wealth enabled her to realize her vision of a 
House of Mercy, her own inner sense of poverty was the source of the vision. 
Her concern for orphan children and destitute females was rooted not in a sense 
of noblesse oblige, nor in an abstract concern for justice, nor in a conventional 
piety, nor merely in compassion. Rather, Catherine identified with the orphans 
and the poor women. For like them—like virtually all women of 19th Century 
Dublin, and probably most other places and times—Catherine knew what it 
meant to be vulnerable, dependent, invisible. Her life story illumines both the 
reasons for Catherine’s identification and solidarity with orphan children and 
destitute females and her creative, graceful response to female vulnerability 
within a patriarchal society. 
Catherine’s own experiences of loss, orphanhood, and vulnerability began 
early. Born in Dublin in 1778 to a Catholic family, Catherine lost her father 
when she was only four years old.23 Her mother died in 1798, just as Catherine’s 
teenage years were ending.24 The death of her father during her young childhood 
appears to have affected Catherine profoundly. First, and rather obviously—this 
early loss was both an emotional and material blow. Certainly her father’s death 
caused her strong identification with both orphans and vulnerable women. 
Second, and less obviously, the loss apparently intensified Catherine’s 
identification with her father. Her principal biographer credits Catherine’s early 
memories of her father providing religious instruction to poor children as a major 
influence on her later vocation.25 Her deep Catholic faith also appears to stem 
from her identification with her father. 
After her mother’s death, Catherine eventually went to live with a wealthy 
Quaker couple, William and Catherine Callaghan.26 She served both as 
household manager and as surrogate daughter to the childless couple.27 
Although she enjoyed the social life typical of affluent Dubliners,28 she 
displayed a noticeable depth of character. She was a “young woman of 
 
 22. For an excellent biography of Catherine McAuley, see MARY C. SULLIVAN, THE PATH OF 
MERCY: THE LIFE OF CATHERINE MCAULEY (Catholic Univ. Press 2012). The Path of Mercy 
serves as the major source for my brief overview of Catherine’s life and work. 
 23. Mercy Intl. Assn., Foundress: The Beginning, http://www.mercyworld.org/foundress/ 
index.cfm?loadref=51 [https://perma.cc/VQ5W-HZRG] (last accessed Aug. 18, 2018) [hereinafter 
The Beginning]. 
 24. Id. 
 25. SULLIVAN, supra note 22, at 19, 38. 
 26. Id. at 30. 
 27. The Beginning, supra note 23. 
 28. SULLIVAN, supra note 22, at 37 (describing Catherine’s love for music and dancing); 38 
(describing Catherine’s living “in good style”). 
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remarkable charm and good looks . . . [but] was also a conscientious thinker, 
appreciative of the surfaces of daily existence, but not satisfied that they were 
all there was to human life.”29 
Just as she identified with orphan children and destitute females, Catherine 
also identified with those who protected and cared for them. This identification 
began with her own parents (recall her memories of her father’s religious 
instruction to poor children) but it deepened during this period of her life. Mrs. 
Callaghan played the strongest role. Mrs. Callaghan’s Quaker spirituality 
included an appreciation of silence and an emphasis on charity to the poor, both 
of which were characteristic of Quakers in Ireland and elsewhere.30 Mrs. 
Callaghan herself was involved with such charity, but as she aged, Catherine 
increasingly became her instrument of that charity.31 Catherine provided 
instruction and counsel to the poor children of the neighborhood, and Mrs. 
Callaghan both approved of this and provided for it materially.32 Of course, Mrs. 
Callaghan’s influence led to the independent influence of coming into contact 
and seeing the needs and privation of poor children and others afflicted by 
poverty. 
During her time with Mr. and Mrs. Callaghan, Catherine’s identity as a 
caregiver grew, but, just as importantly, so did her actual caregiving skills. Mrs. 
Callaghan was bedridden for three years during her final illness.33 Catherine, 
whose bedroom was adjacent, “learned what one learns to do for the sick by 
doing it.”34 She read to Mrs. Callaghan and often slept on a couch in the room 
so that she could tend to her needs at all hours.35 
During this period of caregiving, when she was “faced with a new and time-
consuming form of mercifulness,”36 Catherine began dreaming of orphan 
children and destitute women.37 These dreams focused on empowerment for 
these vulnerable Dubliners: the destitute women of her dreams were “learning 
employable household skills.”38 
Catherine’s dreams began to take concrete form after Mrs. Callaghan’s 
death. Catherine’s caregiving responsibilities had not diminished: she was 
caring for both the elderly and the very young.39 Yet in the midst of these 
exhausting responsibilities, she envisioned a future in which she would rent out 
 
 29. Id. at 32. 
 30. Id. at 40. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. SULLIVAN, supra note 22, at 40-41. 
 34. Id. at 41. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 40. 
 37. Id. at 41. 
 38. SULLIVAN, supra note 22, at 41. 
 39. She cared for both Mr. Callaghan and the children of a cousin who had died. Id. at 53. 
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rooms and work with and for the poor: “Night after night she would see herself 
in some very large place where a number of young women were employed as 
laundresses or at plain-work, while she herself would be surrounded by a crowd 
of ragged children which she was washing and dressing very busily.”40 
The dreams were realistic. Mr. Callaghan was a wealthy man, and when he 
died, Catherine inherited a fortune.41 Catherine used her fortune to build and 
open the House of Mercy.42 It served as a homeless shelter for women and girls, 
a school for poor girls, and a job training center for women.43 Poor women and 
girls immediately flocked to it, and poverty-stricken parents soon found this free 
school for their daughters.44 Within a year, Catherine and the lay women living 
at or assisting with the House of Mercy began visiting the sick in Dublin’s slums 
and wherever else the women could gain admission.45 
Several features of the House of Mercy shed light on Catherine’s values. 
First, it was located in the heart of a fashionable, affluent area, where the poor 
would not be invisible to the rich.46 Second, from the outset and prior to the 
founding of a religious congregation, Catherine McAuley and the House of 
Mercy were devoted to education, especially for poor women; to job training, 
again for poor women; and to compassion for and service to the sick, especially 
the poor. Catherine seems to have regarded education and job training, like 
visiting the sick, as forms of caregiving. Differently put, all of the initial 
ministries of the House of Mercy revolved around an ethic of care. Third, the 
House of Mercy served as a model of female agency: a woman conceived it and 
women ran it.47 Finally, it was initially a lay house, perhaps much like Jane 
Addams’ Hull House or Dorothy Day’s original Catholic Worker House: “[T]he 
idea of founding a religious congregation never entered [Catherine’s] mind” at 
the time she built the House of Mercy.48 
The founding of the Sisters of Mercy itself apparently was motivated in part 
by practical concerns—a belief that the mission would best be continued through 
 
 40. Id. at 53. 
 41. In 2007 U.S. dollars (the date her biographer used), she inherited somewhere between 
$1.78 and $3.65 million, some of which was to be paid as an annuity. Id. 
 42. Id. at 66. 
 43. SULLIVAN, supra note 22, at 67. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 71. 
 46. Id. at 55, 68. Some of the wealthy residents of the area objected to the House of Mercy, 
preferring a neighborhood free of any inconvenient reminders of the grinding poverty of so many 
Dubliners. However, others—both Catholics and Protestants—saw the poverty that surrounded 
them and responded with generosity and compassion. 
 47. This, too, created grumbling in some circles. See id. at 68 (noting that some of the 
complaints about Catherine were “flavored with sexist overtones”); See SULLIVAN, supra note 22, 
at 88 (noting people’s objection to the resident lay women’s “mode of life”). Of course, many 
priests, clerics, and other men supported Catherine’s vision. 
 48. Id. at 65. 
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a religious congregation.49 After its founding, the congregation expanded 
throughout Ireland and into England, and Catherine spent many years traveling 
across the countryside establishing convent houses dedicated to serving poor 
women.50 Unfortunately, Catherine herself was sick with tuberculosis, and, 
worn out from her travels, died in late 1841.51 
In the House of Mercy and the subsequent communities, the influence of 
Catherine’s parents and of Mr. and Mrs. Callaghan is apparent. But the person 
of Jesus—both Catherine’s identification with and understanding of him—also 
served as a model. Dr. Mary Sullivan describes the central strands of Catherine’s 
faith and motivation. They include Catherine’s belief “in the thoroughness of 
Jesus Christ’s compassionate, even ‘tender,’ identification with the ‘least’—
with those who were poor and suffering.”52 The concept of self-bestowal, or 
giving of self to and for the sake of others, also figures prominently, with Jesus 
as the self-bestowal of God, his death on the cross as the “fullest human 
expression” of God’s self-bestowal, and the gospels as an invitation to us to 
participate in this self-bestowal.53 Finally, Catherine believed that human 
mercifulness is the “principal path . . . to those who are desirous of following 
[Jesus].”54 
Part VI contains a more complete discussion of how Catherine’s life and 
values should inform legal education in the Mercy tradition, but the following 
themes merit identification now: 
a) Vocation as a creative and skilled response to our vulnerabilities and 
wounds: Catherine’s vocation appears to be rooted in the early loss of 
her father, which led to her identification and solidarity with orphans and 
poor women. During much of her early adulthood she acquired 
caregiving skills that she later used to care for and thereby empower 
orphans and poor women. Put more generally, for many of us, our 
professional vocation not only serves others, but also can fulfill our own 
need to heal our wounds. Differently put, our own suffering can open us 
to the suffering of others in ways that are life-giving for all. 
 
 49. Foundress: Foundation, MERCY INTL. ASS’N., http://www.mercyworld.org/foundress/ 
index.cfm?loadref=52 [https://perma.cc/2SVW-FQJ2] (last accessed Aug. 18, 2018) [hereinafter 
Foundation]. 
 50. Foundress: Expansion, MERCY INTL. ASS’N., http://www.mercyworld.org/foundress/ 
index.cfm?loadref=54 [https://perma.cc/MZW8-WBR5] (last accessed Aug. 18, 2018) [hereinafter 
Expansion]. 
 51. Foundress: Final Months, MERCY INTL. ASS’N., http://www.mercyworld.org/foundress/ 
index.cfm?loadref=66 [https://perma.cc/7CEP-RNJH] (last accessed Aug. 18, 2018) [hereinafter 
Final Months]. 
 52. SULLIVAN, supra note 22, at 159. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
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b) Vocation as a response to and development of preexisting identifications: 
As described above, Catherine probably identified as a caregiver very 
early in life. This identity grew stronger during her early adulthood, as 
she learned from and cared for Mrs. Callaghan. Catherine’s principal 
work in the world—her founding of the House of Mercy and then the 
Mercy congregation—was simply a continuation and expansion of an 
identity she had long ago claimed and developed. Differently put, 
professional identity formation usually begins well before one 
consciously selects a profession or life path. 
c) The centrality of an ethic of care: Catherine described mercifulness as 
the principal path for followers of Jesus. Her words and deeds reveal an 
ethic of care, meaning in part a conviction that caregiving is “an ethical 
activity, rather than . . . a strictly emotional—and hence morally 
arbitrary—response.”55 
d) The dignity and agency of women: Catherine clearly enjoyed a strong 
sense of self and of agency: she would not have founded a House of 
Mercy and placed it smack in the middle of a wealthy area of town if she 
lacked confidence in her own vision or ability to act. Moreover, the 
House of Mercy was devoted largely to uplifting poor women so that 
they and their children would enjoy some measure of dignity and 
autonomy. 
e) The Gospel call to self-bestowal: Catherine understood life as a spiritual 
journey centered in and toward God.56 And throughout this journey, we 
are invited to follow and imitate Jesus through self-bestowal, or the 
giving of ourselves in service to others. Indeed, self-bestowal is our core 
and common calling. 
Catherine McAuley’s life and work were only the beginning of the Mercy 
congregation. As the next section will describe, the Sisters of Mercy spread to 
the Americas and founded both hospitals and colleges. They also preserved 
Catherine’s original charism while adapting it to new places and circumstances.  
 
 55. ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 23 (NYU Press 1997). Carol Gilligan, whose 
psychological research on children’s moral development led to the term “ethic of care,” identifies 
the ethic of care as a “‘different voice’ . . . that join[s] self with relationship and reason with 
emotion.” Interview with Carol Gilligan, University Prof., New York University (June 6, 2011) 
(available at https://ethicsofcare.org/carol-gilligan/ [https://perma.cc/QF39-9AUF]). Gilligan 
describes the ethic of care as grounded in voice and relationships, in the importance of everyone 
having a voice, being listened to carefully (in their own right and on their own terms) and heard 
with respect. An ethics of care directs our attention to the need for responsiveness in relationships 
(paying attention, listening, responding) and to the costs of losing connection with oneself or others. 
Its logic is inductive, contextual, psychological, rather than deductive or mathematical. Id. 
 56. SULLIVAN, supra note 22, at 159. 
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III.  THE SISTERS OF MERCY OF THE AMERICAS: DEVELOPMENT, CHARISM, 
AND CRITICAL CONCERNS 
The second major source for a vision of Mercy legal education is the modern 
Mercy Institute, especially within the United States. 
The core ministries of the Sisters of Mercy have remained the same despite 
the passage of both time and oceans.57 At the time of Catherine McAuley’s death 
in 1841, the Sisters of Mercy had been established in England and Ireland.58 In 
1843, the congregation made its way to the United States, at the invitation of the 
Bishop of Pittsburgh;59 by 1854, it was present in major cities in every corner of 
the United States.60 As was true in England and Ireland—and as remains true to 
this day—the Sisters of Mercy61 performed works of mercy, focusing especially 
on education and healthcare and establishing schools and hospitals throughout 
the country.62  
The Sisters of Mercy of the Americas also continue to be inspired by 
Catherine’s core values, especially her concern for vulnerable women and 
children and her embrace of mercy as the principal path for following Jesus63 
However, the 21st century United States is profoundly different from 19th 
century Ireland, and the Mercy Institute naturally has evolved in order to 
embody its charism under new circumstances. 
The Sisters of Mercy of the Americas have identified several core values, 
all of which were inspired by Catherine’s life: spirituality, community, service, 
and social justice.64 The Institute also is committed to the spiritual and corporal 
works of mercy65 as a component of both service and social justice. The terms 
“spirituality,” “community,” “service,” and “social justice” are defined 
consistently with Catherine’s teachings and example. “Spirituality” is an active 
spirituality66 in which members lead lives of service in the world, with prayer 
and contemplation reinforcing service and vice versa. For the Sisters of Mercy, 
 
 57. See infra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 58. Our History, SISTERS OF MERCY, https://www.sistersofmercy.org/about-us/our-history/ 
[https://perma.cc/6QHM-A32E] (last accessed Apr. 14, 2019). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Within North and South America, the proper name for the congregation is the Institute of 
the Sisters of Mercy of the Americas. However, for the sake of brevity, I will simply refer to the 
“Sisters of Mercy” or the “Mercy Institute” (or the “Institute”). 
 62. Id. See infra Part IV (will address the Mercy educational ministry in greater detail). 
 63. Cf. Mission and Values, SISTERS OF MERCY, https://www.sistersofmercy.org/about-us/ 
our-history/ [https://perma.cc/AA4P-AHHL] (describing continued influence of Catherine 
McAuley and referring to core values, including social justice concerns) (last accessed Apr. 14, 
2019). 
 64. Mission and Values, SISTERS OF MERCY, https://www.sistersofmercy.org/about-us/ 
mission-values/ [https://perma.cc/35G5-UE7G] (last accessed Aug. 19, 2018). 
 65. Id. (naming the works of mercy). 
 66. Id. 
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living in “community” “deepens our relationship with God, strengthens us for 
mission, and continually inspires us in our call to serve others.”67 “Service” 
focuses on the alleviation of suffering, especially among the most marginalized 
within society.68 Finally, service must include “social justice” work; that is, it 
includes not only direct service to alleviate suffering but also the work to change 
unjust systems that cause human suffering.69  
The nature of the commitment to social justice best illustrates the Institute’s 
adaptation of its charism to the needs of our era. Recognizing “the immensity of 
this work [i.e., social justice work],”70 the Sisters of Mercy of the Americas have 
identified a series of interrelated concerns, referred to as the “Critical 
Concerns,”71 which guide the work of individual Sisters and the Institute as a 
whole during this era. 
The five Critical Concerns are Earth, Immigration, Nonviolence, Anti-
Racism, and Women.72 The timeliness and urgency of these concerns is obvious. 
I would show how and why each concern is urgent (e.g., earth: death of the great 
barrier reef and much of ocean wildlife because of climate change; immigration: 
family separations; etc.), but the examples probably will proliferate 
exponentially by the time this article is published. The importance of these 
concerns is self-evident. In addition to the work of individual Sisters of Mercy, 
the Institute itself takes actions (through investments, formal declarations, new 
ministry initiatives) consistent with these concerns.73 
The Institute’s core values and Critical Concerns should play important roles 
within a Mercy law school. However, before the article turns to those roles, Part 
IV will examine the Mercy mission within higher education more generally. 
IV.  MERCY HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES: DEVELOPMENT, 
DISTINCTIVE FEATURES, AND VALUES 
The third major source of my vision for Mercy legal education is Mercy 
higher education more generally, including both empirical information about 
Mercy colleges and universities and scholarly reflection on Mercy identity in 
higher education. 
Education has been and continues to be a central ministry of the Sisters of 
Mercy. Of course, education is a core ministry of many of the active orders 
within the Roman Catholic Church, and Mercy education enjoys many 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Mission and Values, supra note 64. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See generally What We Do, SISTERS OF MERCY, https://www.sistersofmercy.org/about-us 
/mission-values/ [https://perma.cc/8D32-V4G2] (pages describing various Institute ministries, 
including a socially responsible investment ministry) (last accessed Apr. 14, 2019). 
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commonalities with the other major “brands” within Catholic education. At the 
same time, Mercy higher education has its own distinctive flavor. This 
distinctiveness has two major sources: historical differences between the Sisters 
of Mercy and other major educational orders, as well as more recent scholarly 
efforts to define the Mercy educational mission. This section will first discuss 
the development and present status of Mercy higher education within the United 
States; here, a comparison of Mercy and Jesuit higher education will highlight 
Mercy education’s distinctiveness. The section will next examine scholarly 
analyses of Mercy identity in higher education. 
A. Mercy Higher Education in the United States: A Comparative 
Examination 
From the inception of the Sisters of Mercy, Mercy education has focused on 
providing poor girls and women with the practical skills necessary for making a 
living.74 Accompanying this commitment to the poor is a more traditional 
educational mission: in both Ireland and the United States, alongside Mercy 
schools for poor children (especially girls) are what Catherine would have called 
“pension” schools—those where middle-class girls and others paid tuition for 
their education.75 Operating alongside elementary and secondary schools are 
seventeen Mercy-sponsored colleges and universities within the United States, 
many of which initially were women’s schools but most of which are now 
coeducational.76 
These colleges and universities share a history quite similar to that of other 
Catholic colleges and universities. In an earlier era, one of the unspoken 
missions of Catholic higher education was to provide educational opportunities 
and a pathway to the middle class for Catholics—especially Catholic 
immigrants.77 Consistent with the original focus of the Sisters of Mercy but also 
consistent with expectations for women of the era in which they were founded, 
 
 74. See supra Part II. 
 75. See, e.g., About Our Foundress The Educational Vision of Catherine McAuley, ST. 
JOSEPH’S COLLEGE THEOLOGY BLOG (Aug. 2, 2015), https://blogs.sjcme.edu/theology/about-our-
foundress-the-educational-vision-of-catherine-mcauley/ [https://perma.cc/7NZA-CRFA]. 
 76. See Member Institutions, CONFERENCE FOR MERCY HIGHER EDUCATION, 
http://www.mercyhighered.org/member-institutions/index.html [https://perma.cc/GH4A-GHBY] 
(last accessed Nov. 8, 2018). This website contains links to each of the institutions, and each 
institution provides its own history. 
 77. See, e.g., John M. Breen & Lee J. Strang, The Road Not Taken: Catholic Legal Education 
at the Middle of the Twentieth Century, 51 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 553, 589 (2011) (noting large 
number of Catholic immigrants and members of lower socioeconomic classes at Catholic 
institutions of higher education and asserting that the institutions “took seriously their commitment 
to the advancement of the underprivileged”). 
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most Mercy colleges focused on programs in healthcare (principally nursing) 
and education (principally teaching).78 
In other respects, however, Mercy higher education has deviated from other 
Catholic education, especially the major “brand” for Catholic education in the 
United States, Jesuit education. The biggest differences concern reputation, 
wealth, and curriculum. Several Jesuit institutions are rich, elite, national 
universities,79 enjoying billion-dollar endowments,80 storied faculty and 
alumni,81 affluent and well-prepared students, and considerable influence in 
American public life. In contrast, Mercy institutions today tend to be non-elite 
regional and local institutions with small endowments and less affluent students. 
Jesuit universities typically are comprehensive liberal arts universities with 
traditional professional schools (law, theology, medicine). Most Mercy colleges 
and universities are liberal arts institutions with longstanding professional 
programs in teacher education and nursing.82 
These differences have deep roots, tracing back even to the early days of 
each Order. The first difference is gender: the Jesuits are a male order, and the 
Sisters of Mercy are a female congregation; the institutions sponsored by them 
began as all-male or all-female institutions. This difference alone explains many 
 
 78. For example, my own institution, University of Detroit Mercy, was once two separate 
institutions: University of Detroit, a Jesuit institution, and Mercy College of Detroit, which was 
established in 1941 “to prepare young women for careers in nursing and teaching so that they might 
contribute intelligently and effectively to the welfare of society.” See University History, 
UNIVERSITY OF DETROIT MERCY, http://udmercy.edu/about/history.php [https://perma.cc/HXL3-
T6SH] (last accessed Apr. 15, 2019). A search of the websites of other Mercy colleges and 
universities reveals similar origin stories. 
 79. For example, Georgetown University and Boston College are both Jesuit institutions. 
 80. As of 2017, Georgetown University, Boston College, and St. Louis University each had 
endowments exceeding one billion dollars. See US & Canadian Institutions Listed by FY 2017 
Endowment Market Value & Change in Endowment Market Value from FY 2016 to FY 2017, NATL. 
ASS’N OF COLLEGE & UNIV. BUSINESS OFFICERS & COMMONFUND INSTITUTE (available at 
https://www.nacubo.org/-/media/Nacubo/Documents/EndowmentFiles/2017-Endowment-Market-
Values.ashx?la=en&hash=E71088CDC05C76FCA30072DA109F91BBC10B0290 [https://perma. 
cc/X9L8-LHAB]) (last accessed Nov. 26, 2018). 
 81. At Georgetown University, the Walsh School for Foreign Service alone has produced a 
US President (William Jefferson Clinton), a Solicitor General of the United States (Paul Clement), 
CEOs of major corporations, and a plethora of US ambassadors, members of the US Congress, and 
state legislators. See Prominent Alumni, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WALSH SCHOOL OF FOREIGN 
SERVICE, https://sfs.georgetown.edu/alumni/prominent-alumni/ [https://perma.cc/N84D-LSYS] 
(last accessed Nov. 8, 2018). Similarly, Boston College has produced United States Senators, high 
level cabinet officials, CEOs, and prominent athletes and entertainers. See About BC: Notable 
Alumni, BOSTON COLLEGE, https://www.bc.edu/bc-web/about/notable-alumni.html [https://perma. 
cc/SR6P-EKTV] (last accessed Nov. 8, 2018). 
 82. Note the relationship between gender, curricular differences, and institutional wealth. 
Mercy institutions trained women to be nurses and teachers, two occupations open to women. But 
teachers and nurses rarely get rich, become United States Senators, or create endowed chairs in 
academic departments. 
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of the wealth and status disparities that exist between Jesuit and Mercy colleges 
and universities. 
Other differences also account for the divergent paths. Both the Jesuits and 
the Sisters of Mercy founded and operated schools almost from their 
beginnings.83 However, Ignatius of Loyola and the early members of the Society 
of Jesus were educated at the University of Paris, probably the most elite 
educational institution of its day.84 Although the Jesuits initially did not plan to 
be an educational order, at a certain point they “formally and professedly 
designated the staffing and management of schools a true ministry of the order, 
indeed its primary ministry.”85 Moreover, such education was primarily 
intended for “boys and young men who envisaged a worldly career” rather than 
a career as a priest.86 The schools quickly became institutions for the sons of the 
elite or for those who aspired to prominence.87 
In contrast, though highly intelligent and literate, Catherine McCauley did 
not receive an elite education.88 Moreover, as noted above, the early schools 
operated by the Sisters of Mercy were for girls—mostly poor girls—and the 
principal motivation for these schools was to provide girls and young women 
the skills necessary to support themselves and their children.89 These girls were 
not being prepared for leadership positions in society but for subsistence. The 
pension schools for middle-class girls and the women’s colleges and universities 
did offer education in the liberal arts, but professional training was for 
occupations historically defined as female. 
Another difference is rooted in the different personalities and motivations of 
Ignatius and Catherine. Ignatius of Loyola turned from his life as a soldier and 
minor nobleman when he read lives of the saints while recovering from a battle 
 
 83. For an extremely brief description of the beginnings of Mercy-sponsored schools, see 
supra note 42-43 and accompanying text. For a fuller discussion of the beginnings of Jesuit-
sponsored education, see generally John W. O’Malley, How the First Jesuits Became Involved in 
Education, in A JESUIT EDUCATION READER 43 (George W. Traub ed., Loyola Press 2008). 
 84. O’Malley, supra note 83, at 50 (“The original ten founding members of the [Jesuits] were, 
cumulatively, an extraordinarily learned group, all graduates of the University of Paris, which was 
still the most prestigious academic institution in Europe.”). 
 85. Id. at 44. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 55 (“[W]hile the Jesuits of course had no idea of what we today call ‘upward social 
mobility,’ the schools in fact acted in some instances as an opportunity for precisely that.”). 
O’Malley realizes this was never the intention of the early Jesuits, who operated tuition-free 
schools. However, the focus on liberal arts—Latin, Greek, literature, etc.—may have caused some 
less affluent parents to balk, preferring a “more ‘practical’ education in the trades or in commercial 
skills.” Id. at 54-55. 
 88. SULLIVAN, supra note 22, at 22. 
 89. See supra note 42-43 and accompanying text. 
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injury.90 He grew to identify with the saints, but the nature of his identification 
had not changed: he moved from one heroic identification to another, from an 
identification with military heroes to one with heroes of the Christian faith.91 
In contrast, Catherine identified with the marginalized themselves. To be 
sure, she also identified with caregivers, but this identification doesn’t strike me 
as an heroic identification: Mrs. Callaghan’s care for Dublin’s poor was quiet 
and unobtrusive, not calling attention to itself. In other words, the focus was 
more on the needs of the cared for than on the ego needs of the caregiver. Both 
approaches have their merits–those who identify with heroes often accomplish 
heroic things–but one might imagine the universities of an Order founded in part 
out of a desire for the heroic would be elite institutions full of students with 
dreams of (intellectual, moral, artistic, etc.) heroism.92 And one might imagine 
the colleges and universities of a congregation founded in part out of an 
identification with the destitute and their caregivers to be full of students who 
find gratification in caring for others. 
The historical and current realities of Mercy higher education do not form 
an ending point for consideration of Mercy identity. Recent decades have seen 
a growing scholarly conversation regarding Mercy identity in higher education.  
B. Scholarly Reflection on Mercy Identity in Higher Education 
Only in recent decades has there been a systematic effort to identify the 
distinguishing features of Mercy higher education. The lack of such an effort in 
the past is hardly surprising: such institutions often were run largely by Sisters 
of Mercy whose own religious formation influenced the institutions both directly 
and indirectly.93 Given that, introspection regarding the mission of Mercy 
institutions simply wasn’t necessary. 
 
 90. See, e.g., RONALD MODRAS, IGNATIAN HUMANISM 7-10 (2004) (describing Ignatius’ 
conversion). 
 91. Ignatius appears to have moved beyond this heroic identification later in life. See, e.g., 
RON HANSEN, THE PILGRIM: ST. IGNATIUS OF LOYOLA, IN THE IGNATIAN SPIRITUALITY READER 
40 (George W. Traub ed., Loyola Press 2008) (“Ignatius was then fifty and far different from the 
man he’d fantasized he’d be when he was a page to Spanish royalty, or a pilgrim to the Holy Land, 
or a philosopher at the Sorbonne. . . . Ignatius surely imagined a grander fate than that of fifteen 
years of grinding office and managerial work . . . . We hear no regret in his letters, however.”). 
 92. Of course, this view considerably oversimplifies both Jesuit and Mercy institutions, not to 
mention the orders that sponsor them. Both Jesuits and Jesuit institutions have engaged in rigorous 
critique and revisioning of Jesuit colleges and universities. See, e.g., A JESUIT EDUCATION READER 
(George W. Traub ed., Loyola Univ. Press. 2008) (containing essays about how Jesuit colleges and 
universities might better fulfill their missions). 
 93. See Conference for Mercy Higher Education, CMHE History (Aug. 19, 2018), 
http://www.mercyhighered.org/history.html [https://perma.cc/P535-DNA7] (“Until a short 
memory ago, the Mercy colleges and universities in the US were led, managed, and staffed in 
majority by Sisters of Mercy.”). 
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This is a different era—one of fewer women religious (sisters),94 more 
career options for women, and integration of Roman Catholics into mainstream 
American life. These changes prompted several existential questions for Mercy 
institutions of higher education: In what ways are we, or should we be, 
distinctive? How do we preserve this identity in an era characterized by less 
involvement from members of the congregation and by rising secularism within 
society?  
This section focuses on three major efforts to characterize Mercy higher 
education: (1) a Discussion Paper by the Conference on Mercy Higher Education 
(the “CMHE”);95 (2) a response paper by Dr. Mary Sullivan;96 and (3) a short 
paper by Dr. Margaret Farley.97  
The 2004 Discussion Paper by the CMHE, Mercy Higher Education: 
Culture and Characteristics, carries forward Catherine McAuley’s special 
concern for women and children. In fact, the “promotion of compassion and 
justice towards those with less, especially women and children”98 is one of the 
four hallmarks of Mercy higher education.99 Compassion and justice should be 
promoted both inside and outside the classroom, “through action and 
education.”100 Neither action nor education can exist in isolation. Absent 
education, action can all too often be simple-minded and ineffective: 
“Catherine’s approach to social problems was two-fold: address the need as well 
as its root cause. Ministering to those in need without the accompanying action, 
praxis, to seek remediation of the causes, however worthwhile, is not 
sufficient.”101 Accordingly, the Discussion Paper repeatedly emphasizes that 
Mercy institutions must treat as integral some form of “introduction to social 
analysis and skill development in social transformation.”102 Moreover, skills in 
social analysis should be imparted to students early in their course of study so 
that they enjoy opportunities to exercise these skills.103 Finally, the Discussion 
 
 94. Id. 
 95. Conference for Mercy Higher Education, Mercy Higher Education: Culture and 
Characteristics (2004) [hereinafter Discussion Paper]. 
 96. Mary C. Sullivan, Catherine McAuley and the Characteristics of Mercy Higher Education, 
16 The MAST Journal 2, 18 (2006). 
 97. Margaret A. Farley, Wisdom, Dignity, and Justice: Higher Education as a Work of Mercy 
(last accessed Aug. 19, 2018) www.mercyhighered.org/resources/ewExternalFiles/wdj.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3YPY-GCQ9]. 
 98. Discussion Paper, supra note 95. 
 99. The other identified hallmarks are regard for the dignity of the person, academic 
excellence, and education of the whole person. Id. at 1. These three hallmarks likely characterize 
(or are aspirational for) virtually all Catholic higher education and probably most broadly 
humanistic education. The commitment to women, children, and the poor is unique. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 5 (emphasis added). 
 102. Id. at 3. 
 103. Discussion Paper, supra note 95 at 15. 
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Paper gives service learning a privileged place, urging Mercy institutions to 
integrate it into the curriculum.104  
The centrality of compassion and justice for women and children is 
distinctively Mercy. The very reason the Sisters of Mercy sponsor educational 
institutions is to “address their enduring concerns,”105 and “Catherine 
McAuley’s preferential love for the poor and her special concern for women”106 
continue to enjoy privileged status within the congregation. More broadly, 
Mercy ministries focus on “all areas of human services from housing and 
homeless shelters, to hospitals and hospices, to pastoral ministries and diocesan 
offices.”107 This close, tender focus on the human person and on care for the 
human person is, therefore, a defining characteristic of Mercy higher education. 
Dr. Mary Sullivan has proposed three additional hallmarks beyond those 
articulated in the CMHE Discussion Paper: 
a) “Religious learning and spiritual development, through frequent courses 
in Christian theology and the Scriptures, courses in other religions, 
Catholic liturgical celebrations, and other religious events;”108 
b) Education in and a commitment to mercifulness, as revealed in the Mercy 
of God made manifest in Jesus Christ;”109 
c) “The strenuous effort to give good example, by modeling, personally and 
corporately, all the values it seeks to promote through its educational and 
other endeavors.”110 
Each of these three hallmarks is rooted in Catherine McAuley’s own educational 
values, as expressed in her drafts of the original Rule of the Sisters of Mercy, as 
well as her letters and other writings. According to Dr. Sullivan, Catherine’s 
“enduring educational values”111 include the “fundamental necessity of 
Christian learning and spiritual development,”112 the “primacy to be always 
given to mercifulness and spiritual consolation,”113 and the “demanding effort 
to ‘practice what we teach/preach,’ i.e., to be ourselves, personally and 
institutionally, insofar as humanly possible, examples of the Mercy heritage we 
claim to promote and transmit.”114 Of course, these values exist alongside 
Catherine’s special commitment, which transcended education—to girls and 
 
 104. Id. at 15-16. 
 105. Id. at 9. 
 106. Id. at 9-10 (citing the Constitutions of the Sisters of Mercy of the Americas ##5-7). 
 107. Discussion Paper, supra note 95, at 3. 
 108. Sullivan, supra note 96, at 24. 
 109. Id. at 25. 
 110. Id. at 26. 
 111. Id. at 18. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Sullivan, supra note 96, at 18. 
 114. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2019] LAW SCHOOL IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 419 
women.115 For Dr. Sullivan, the three additional proposed hallmarks of Mercy 
education follow from these enduring educational values. 
First, Dr. Sullivan believes that Mercy institutions of higher education 
should emphasize religious learning and spiritual development, both inside and 
outside the classroom. Catherine McAuley believed the principal purpose of 
Mercy education was spiritual consolation. Yes, education should impart 
knowledge, develop students’ intellectual skills, prepare students for the 
workplace, and so forth, but the primary purpose of education is to “comfort, 
encourage, and console [students] in the most thorough and lasting way 
possible.”116 Given this, religious learning and spiritual development are at the 
core of the Mercy educational mission.  
An explicitly Christian identity and emphasis on religious learning and 
spiritual development exists in an atmosphere of openness to, welcoming of, and 
respect for those from other traditions. Dr. Sullivan recognizes—and believes 
Catherine McAuley would herself embrace—the “ecumenical and interfaith 
respect, aspirations, and understandings of the present time.”117 Nonetheless, Dr. 
Sullivan believes that Mercy institutions should not allow this respect and 
collaboration to “silence or diminish a courteous emphasis on and provision for 
explicitly Christian and, where necessary, Catholic religious education and 
experience.”118 Dr. Sullivan suggests this emphasis is possible through a variety 
of religion courses from various faith traditions, through frequent liturgical 
celebrations, and through opportunities for prayer.119 
Second, Dr. Sullivan believes that Mercy institutions should be 
characterized by a commitment to mercifulness. She describes this principally 
as an institutional attitude that, while upholding high standards, values 
“forgiveness, gentleness, sensitivity, empathy towards distress, charity of mind 
and heart, sympathy, self-sacrifice for the sake of another’s need, loving 
kindness, humility.”120 She also acknowledges that, at times, this focus on 
mercifulness will influence “the curricula, the content of courses, and again 
where appropriate, their methods and objectives.”121  
Finally, Dr. Sullivan asserts that Mercy institutions should be characterized 
by a strong commitment to modeling the Mercy values the institution seeks to 
transmit to students. In other words, faculty members and administrators—all 
employees—should strive to embody the Mercy charism. As Dr. Sullivan 
documents, Catherine believed that “the first means . . . to render us most useful 
 
 115. Id. at 23. 
 116. Id. at 24. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Sullivan, supra note 96, at 24-25. 
 119. Id. at 25. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
420 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:401 
to others . . . is to give good example.”122 Sullivan elaborates on the importance 
of this insight to the educational process: 
The challenge these words present to Mercy educators may not have fully 
dawned upon us. We are to be and do what we teach. If we wish to teach 
mercifulness, we must speak and act mercifully toward others. If we wish to 
teach forgiveness, we must forgive others and ask for their forgiveness. . . . If 
we wish to teach others to serve and respect those who are economically poor, 
we must first serve and respect them ourselves. This is the primary principle and 
method of Mercy education as Catherine McAuley conceived and practiced 
it.123 
In short, “[i]f students do not see evidences of the characteristics of a Mercy 
education in their teachers’ example, as well as in their words, such 
characteristics will be only half affirmed, if at all.”124 
Feminist theologian and ethicist Dr. Margaret Farley approaches the 
question of Mercy higher education differently. Both the CMHE Discussion 
Paper and Dr. Mary Sullivan’s response examine Catherine McAuley’s life and 
the priorities of the Sisters of Mercy and derive from those sources defining 
attributes of Mercy higher education. Dr. Farley asks a different question: what 
is required for higher education to be a work of mercy?125  
Dr. Farley asserts that higher education is a work of mercy when wisdom, 
dignity, justice, and mercy are held together.126 Her starting point is that the 
“central goal of higher education is to grow in wisdom.”127 Moreover, she 
considers all higher education a form of initiation into a culture. However, a 
focus on wisdom and on cultural initiation is not inconsistent with professional 
training and preparation, that is, with preparing persons to “advance the skills 
and services that a society needs.”128 In her view, at the heart of real wisdom is 
learning—through a variety of disciplines—”about the interrelationships of all 
beings and the dignity at the heart of every person.”129 This learning involves 
not merely a study of human achievements but also an encounter with human 
suffering.130 
 
 122. Id. at 26. 
 123. Sullivan, supra note 96, at 23. 
 124. Id. at 26. 
 125. Farley, supra note 97, at 3. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 4. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Farley, supra note 97, at 4. (“Learning of human successes without learning of human 
pain, or learning about conquerors without learning about the exploited and the conquered, learning 
about leaders and their ideas without learning about the marginalized and the poor, led and still 
may lead to the estrangement of an educated elite from the lives of the desperate and from the 
worldwide phenomenon of human misery.”). 
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For Dr. Farley, the core wisdom concerning the “concrete reality of human 
persons” is that “all of us are ends in ourselves. . . . [and] are to be treated as 
ends, not only as means.”131 We are ends in ourselves for two reasons: our 
freedom, that is, the notion that “our selves and our actions are in an important 
sense our own. . . . [and] we can determine the meaning of our own lives;”132 
and our relationality, that is, “our capacities to know and be known, love and be 
loved.”133 This freedom and this relationality are interconnected: 
Freedom and relationality, moreover, do not compete; they are intimately 
connected. Relationships make freedom of self-determination possible (for 
without them we cannot grow in freedom); but freedom is ultimately for the sake 
of choosing relationships—of choosing what and how to love. Herein lies the 
basis of human dignity and the requirement to grow in wisdom regarding what 
humans need.134 
And out of this wisdom, this knowledge of human dignity, “arise imperatives of 
human justice.”135 Finally—and as described more fully in Part VI, infra—
justice requires mercy, just as mercy requires justice.136  
These three scholarly reflections are necessary threads in the tapestry of 
legal education in the Mercy tradition. However, these threads do not speak 
directly to legal education. For that we must turn to a discussion of religiously 
affiliated law schools, focusing on Jesuit identity within legal education. 
V.  THE RELIGIOUSLY AFFILIATED LAW SCHOOL: REFLECTIONS ON JESUIT 
IDENTITY IN LEGAL EDUCATION 
Any articulation of Mercy identity in legal education does not take place in 
a vacuum. Supplementing discussion of the Mercy charism in higher education 
is a lively literature concerning Jesuit identity at American law schools.137 If 
course, this literature exists alongside broader discussions concerning Catholic 
law schools more generally and, indeed, concerning all religiously affiliated law 
 
 131. Id. at 5. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Farley, supra note 97, at 5. 
 136. Id. at 7-8. 
 137. See, e.g., C. Michael Bryce, Teaching Justice to Law Students: The Legacy of Ignatian 
Education and Commitment to Justice and Justice Learning in 21st Century Legal Education, 43 
GONZ. L. REV. 577 (2007) (arguing that clinical education and mentoring are best tools to promote 
justice within Jesuit law schools); Andrew Moore, Contact and Concepts: Educating Students at 
Jesuit Law Schools, 41 GONZ. L. REV. 459 (2006) (discussing best means within law school 
curriculum of “forming men and women for others”); Daniel J. Morrissey, Bringing the Messiah 
Through Law: Legal Education at the Jesuit Schools, 48 ST. LOUIS UNIV. L.J. 549 (2004) 
(examining the loss within Jesuit law schools of a connection to the Catholic cultural and 
intellectual tradition). 
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schools. Scholarship on Jesuit and other religiously affiliated law schools 
necessarily informs my thinking on Mercy legal education. This section 
considers two major, and contrasting, views of Jesuit legal education—those of 
Professors John Breen and Gregory Kalscheur. 
A. Professor John Breen, the Catholic Intellectual Tradition, and the Law 
School Curriculum 
Professor John Breen’s vision for Jesuit legal education forms the starting 
point for contemporary discussion. Over the course of three articles, he makes a 
positive case for a renewed focus on traditional classroom study of substantive 
justice, including but not limited to understandings of justice gleaned from 
natural law and the larger Catholic intellectual tradition.138 
Professor Breen’s positive vision is an outgrowth of his critique of Jesuit 
legal education. He probably is foremost among the critics who charge that (a) 
Jesuit law schools lack any distinctive character, and (b) they try to cover their 
lack of distinctiveness by extolling the virtues of their clinical programs.139  
This lack of distinctiveness begins with Jesuit schools’ lack of attention to 
justice—an inattention that mirrors that of the rest of the legal academy. 
Professor Breen begins with an anecdote from his own Jesuit institution, Loyola 
University of Chicago School of Law. In a “moment of incredulous reflection” 
during a panel discussion, a third-year law student noted that “this was the first 
time in any of her classes that she could recall any meaningful discussion of 
justice.”140 The student found this absence of concerns of justice from the law 
school classroom “especially disappointing because she had attended a Jesuit 
university for her undergraduate studies where such discussions had regularly 
taken place, and . . . she had been attracted to Loyola’s law school because of its 
Jesuit identity.”141 In short, Breen’s starting point is the apparent invisibility of 
justice concerns in legal education generally. 
He then identifies this lack of attention to substantive justice as a major 
cause of the well documented malaise afflicting the legal profession: “[T]he 
fundamental problem that confounds the legal profession today is that many 
 
 138. See John M. Breen, Justice and Legal Education: A Critique, 36 LOY. CHI. L.J. 383 (2005) 
[hereinafter Justice and Legal Education]; John M. Breen, The Air in the Balloon: Further Notes 
on Catholic and Jesuit Identity in Legal Education, 43 GONZ. L. REV. 41 (2007) [hereinafter Air 
in the Balloon]; John M. Breen, Action as the Fruit of Contemplation: A Reply to Bryce, Donnelly, 
Kalscheur, and Nussbaum, 43 GONZ. L. REV. 645 (2007) [hereinafter Action as the Fruit of 
Contemplation]. 
 139. See, e.g. Air in the Balloon, supra note 138, at 42-44 (“Jesuit legal education, as it is 
currently practiced in this country, must be judged as a failure based on the very standards of 
success set forth by the Society of Jesus. . . . [T]he claim of Jesuit distinctiveness in legal education 
simply cannot stand up to scrutiny.”). 
 140. Justice and Legal Education, supra note 138, at 383. 
 141. Id. 
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lawyers no longer see a connection between the ordinary work they perform for 
clients and the virtue of justice.”142 And he observes that law schools lay the 
foundation for this malaise and alienation by teaching students to divorce their 
own moral beliefs, including those about justice, from their understanding of 
law143 and by (perhaps unwittingly) teaching students that “the practice of law 
requires a kind of agnosticism, and that the consummate professional is the 
consummate agnostic for whom all justice is relative.”144 
Jesuit law schools are not exempt from this grim portrait of the state of 
American legal education. Jesuits’ “public statements of self-identity” indicate 
their hope and expectation that “graduates of Jesuit universities will gain a deep 
appreciation for and commitment to justice in the course of their Jesuit 
education.”145 However, students’ actual experiences at Jesuit law schools 
contrast starkly with the Jesuits’ public proclamations about justice.146 
In describing his positive vision for Jesuit legal education, Professor Breen 
traces the modern concern of the Jesuits, beginning with the leadership of Pedro 
Arrupe, with issues of social justice and with being men and women for 
others.147 Graduates of Jesuit institutions should strive “‘to be an agent of change 
in society; not merely resisting unjust structures and arrangements, but actively 
undertaking to reform them.’”148 Indeed, for the Jesuits, the “‘promotion of 
justice and liberation of the oppressed is a constitutive element’” of Christian 
mission.149 
As Professor Breen observes, this concern for justice should be central to 
the Jesuit educational mission. For Jesuits, education—an “‘interplay between 
experience, reflection, decision and action’”—is, at its heart, preparation for 
building a more just world.150 According to Breen, law schools have 
demonstrated this concern for justice principally (perhaps exclusively) through 
the clinics they offer.151 
This relegation of justice concerns to the law school clinics is, for Breen, 
simply inadequate. Some of the reasons he gives are now outdated: for example, 
 
 142. Id. at 385. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Justice and Legal Education, supra note 138, at 387. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 387-91. 
 148. Id. at 388. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Justice and Legal Education, supra note 138, at 389–90. 
 151. Id. at 392–94. Professor Breen also notes that, apart from clinics, Jesuit law schools’ 
commitment to justice is principally rhetorical and is expressed through lip service in web and other 
promotional materials. Id. at 391–92. 
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he notes that most law students will not take a clinic, and that most law schools 
will not require clinics.152 However, this is not his principal concern. 
To be sure, “[t]he provision of legal services to the poor and disadvantaged 
undoubtedly makes a valuable contribution to a school’s Jesuit identity.”153 But 
this contribution is “at best . . . [an] incomplete attempt to satisfy the Jesuit 
demand for the promotion of justice.”154 Among other things, Professor Breen 
says, “clinical instruction does not teach students to think about justice. . . . [but] 
encourages an affective rather than an analytical approach to situations involving 
injustice. . . . [W]here any matter is in any way complicated, empathy is no 
substitute for critical thinking.”155 In further support of his point, he states that 
a university is an intellectual endeavor and so “the Jesuit identity of a university 
must be manifest in the intellectual work that the university performs, namely, 
the dissemination of knowledge and the search for truth.”156 
Professor Breen’s solution to this issue rests principally in additions to the 
standard law school curriculum. At the least, Jesuit law schools should teach 
students to think analytically about issues of justice by requiring first-year 
students to take “an introductory course in moral theory and jurisprudence,” then 
requiring upper level students to take some more advanced course (e.g., feminist 
legal theory).157 The introductory course should include some form of “serious 
engagement with the Catholic intellectual tradition.”158 This tradition often 
“challenge[s] the dominant conception of justice in American law.”159 
According to Professor Breen, the mainstream view within American law is that 
human beings are “radically autonomous individuals who create value through 
the exercise of individual choice” and that this view “has led to an impoverished 
discourse concerning the common good and an understanding of justice in law 
 
 152. Id. at 396. All of his articles were written in the years prior to ABA Standard 303(a) (3), 
which requires all law students at ABA-accredited schools to take six experiential learning credits. 
See ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, 2018-2019 STANDARDS 
AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS 16 (2018), https://www.american 
bar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_education/Standards/2018-2019ABAStandards 
forApprovalofLawSchools/2018-2019-aba-standards-chapter3.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/Q7VG-WXYU]. 
 153. Justice and Jesuit Legal Education, supra note 138, at 395. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 396–97 (“think” emphasized in original; other emphasis added). 
 156. Id. at 399. One might reasonably question Professor Breen’s condescending (in my view) 
assumptions about the intellectual value of clinics. Implicit (and sometimes explicit) in his critiques 
are assumptions that clinics engage students affectively but not intellectually, and that, though kind 
of sweet, the work of clinics is not part of the “real” intellectual work of a university. Admittedly I 
am exaggerating a bit. However, other critics agree that he underestimates the value of clinic 
education. See, e.g., Bryce, supra note 137 at 605–06 (discussing intellectual value of clinics). 
 157. Justice and Legal Education, supra note 138, at 401. 
 158. Id. at 405. 
 159. Id. at 407. 
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that is almost entirely procedural in nature.”160 In contrast, the Catholic 
intellectual tradition takes the substantive stance that a legal system and, indeed, 
society as a whole, must be judged by how it treats its most vulnerable 
members.161 Moreover, persons are understood not merely as rights-bearers, but 
as possessing both political and moral responsibilities; this means that justice 
requires not merely the recognition of rights, but also “the duty to support the 
common good of society.”162 The introductory course in moral theory and 
jurisprudence would introduce students to this view of justice, along with several 
others.163 
Other legal educators agree that Professor Breen’s concern for the mission 
and integrity of Jesuit law schools is “timely, welcome, and important,”164 but 
reject his diagnosis and proposals for reasons both substantive and practical.165 
Professor Gregory Kalscheur is among Professor Breen’s foremost critics and 
has articulated an alternate view of Jesuit legal education. 
B. Professor Gregory Kalscheur and Jesuit Legal Education as Formation 
Professor Gregory Kalscheur, himself both a Jesuit and a law professor, 
takes issue with both Professor Breen’s conception of the Catholic intellectual 
tradition and his vision for legal education.166 These critiques are related: a 
different understanding of the Catholic intellectual tradition results in a different 
conception of Jesuit legal education. 
Professor Kalscheur first takes issue with Breen’s view of the Catholic 
intellectual tradition as a set of doctrines. “[I]t is a mistake to reduce justice and 
engagement with the Catholic intellectual tradition to a set of concepts to be 
talked about, rather than as virtues to be lived.”167 Rather than being a body of 
doctrine, the Catholic intellectual tradition is a way of proceeding. 
 
 160. Id. at 407–08. 
 161. Id. at 408. 
 162. Justice and Legal Education, supra note 138, at 408–09. 
 163. Throughout the three articles, Professor Breen never asserts that only the Catholic 
intellectual tradition should enjoy a place at the table. In fact, he argues strongly for exposing 
students to a variety of perspectives. For example, he points to Deborah Rhodes’ work on 
incorporating ethical perspectives across the curriculum. See Air in the Balloon, supra note 138, at 
74. 
 164. Gregory A. Kalscheur, Conversation in Aid of a “Conspiracy” for Truth: A Candid 
Discussion about Jesuit Law Schools, Justice, and Engaging the Catholic Intellectual Tradition, 
43 GONZ. L. REV. 559, 560 (2007). 
 165. See, e.g., Kalscheur, supra note 164; see also, e.g., Thomas More Donnelly, The Leaven 
of the World: Serving the Poor is Neither the Air in the Balloon Nor the Cherry on the Sundae, 43 
GONZ. L. REV. 607 (2007) (arguing that clinics, not a ‘window-dressing’ course on jurisprudence, 
are the best starting point for teaching students about justice). 
 166. Kalscheur, supra note 164, at 562. Professor Kalscheur also notes that “the tone and style 
of engagement that one adopts with respect to this issue is critical.” Id. 
 167. Id. at 563. 
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The Catholic tradition of virtue ethics understands the moral virtues—including 
the virtue of justice—as matters of character. A virtue is a rightly ordered love 
involving an integration of head and heart, of intellect and affect. In other words, 
a virtue is a quality of character that disposes a person habitually to see the world 
in certain ways and to respond to the world in certain ways.168 
According to Professor Kalscheur, the starting point for the Catholic 
intellectual tradition is a conviction “that reality is purposeful and imbued with 
meaning and that reality’s purpose and meaning are summed up in the unity of 
all things with God patterned on the unity between the divine and the human 
embodied in Christ.”169 From this starting point follows an “intrinsically 
religious intellectual dynamism of all human inquiry toward ultimate questions 
of meaning, coherence, and truth.”170 
He asserts that four traits characterize the Catholic intellectual tradition: 
1) First, the “conviction that faith and reason are mutually illuminating and 
are united in the search for truth;”171 
2) Second, a sacramentalism that recognizes that “the pursuit of truth in any 
discipline is a holy activity;”172 
3) Third, “[o]penness to the “analogical imagination (a tendency to see 
things in terms of both/and rather than in terms of either/or);”173 and 
4) Fourth, reverence for human dignity and a commitment to justice and the 
common good.174 
In short, Professor Kalscheur points to a living tradition, the substantive 
particulars of which may evolve as human knowledge develops.175 Moreover, 
this tradition has and continues to develop “in dialogue with the full range of 
human cultures and intellectual traditions.”176 
Just as Professor Kalscheur’s understanding of the Catholic intellectual 
tradition differs from that of Professor Breen, his notion of what this means for 
Jesuit legal education also differs. Although he expresses no objection to a 
course on jurisprudence, he does not consider such a course central to the Jesuit 
mission in legal education.177 For Kalscheur, the cardinal virtues of a Jesuit law 
 
 168. Id. at 564. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 564-65. 
 171. Kalscheur, supra note 164 at 565. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 566. 
 174. Id. 
 175. See id. at 566 (“[T]he Catholic intellectual tradition is a dynamic, living, ongoing, not-yet-
completed conversation and is not properly understood as a static body of knowledge.”). 
 176. Kalscheur, supra note 164 at 566. 
 177. Id. at 567 (“[T]he Jesuit law school does not promote justice and the common good solely, 
or even most effectively, by demanding that students learn about justice from a Catholic perspective 
as one component of a new required course.”). 
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school are both justice and “intellectual solidarity,” that is, “[t]aking other 
persons, societies, and cultures seriously enough to engage them in conversation 
and debate about what makes life worth living, including what will make for the 
good of the city and the globe.”178 
But justice within the Jesuit context, says Professor Kalscheur, “is better 
understood as a way of living that promotes the common good.”179 And that way 
of living is achieved through the process of formation: the goal of Jesuit legal 
education is to form a “certain kind of person committed to serving the common 
good of society.”180 Therefore, the questions Jesuit law schools should ask in 
assessing whether they are fulfilling their mission are: 
Do students leave our law schools more responsive to the needs of humanity or 
less so? What sorts of human beings do our students become during their time 
in our law schools? Do the students we educate come to embody a commitment 
to justice [to doing justice rather than merely analyzing it]?181 
And the starting point for formation is knowing our students and ourselves: 
If the law school hopes to prepare women and men who are moved to a 
constructive, responsible, and loving use of their knowledge, then we have to 
take seriously the hopes and desires that brought the students to us, as well as 
the hopes and desires that move their hearts as they encounter the human realities 
that lie at the heart of the legal enterprise. And if we hope to educate not just 
good lawyers, but lawyers who lead good lives, then all of us have to continually 
ask ourselves what kinds of people we are becoming as we immerse ourselves 
in the study and teaching and practice of the law.182 
But formation also takes place through enculturation, and Professor Kalscheur 
sees Jesuit legal education as ideally embodying a set of cultural conditions that 
are conducive to formation of lawyers concerned for the common good. In his 
view, five cultural characteristics should predominate: (1) a humane culture in 
the classroom and in the larger law school community; (2) a culture faithful to 
the idea of a university—a place where all authentic human questions, including 
questions of faith, are part of the conversation; (3) a culture committed to 
promoting human dignity and the common good; (4) a culture of dialogue and 
intellectual solidarity, in which people with different life experiences and 
perspectives speak and listen to one another with the goal of discerning the 
common good; and (5) a culture of discernment and vocation, the notion that 
 
 178. Id. (quoting David Hollenbach, Address at Loyola University Chicago, The Catholic 
University and the Common Good (Nov. 6, 2007) (available at http://www.luc.edu/ccity/hollen 
bachtalk.html [https://perma.cc/T7D5-LWDC])). 
 179. Kalscheur, supra note 164, at 567. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 568. 
 182. Id. at 570. 
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students are being formed to fulfill callings that arise from the deepest, holiest 
desires of their hearts.183 
Professor Kalscheur’s approach has the virtue of depth and nuance, and—
perhaps necessarily given its virtues—lacks a certain clarity; Professor Breen’s 
approach has the virtue of clarity, even if it risks a certain superficiality. Other 
participants in this conversation have taken issue with Professor Breen’s 
characterization of clinics and have argued that clinics are the best starting point 
for thinking about justice, even if a course in jurisprudence or moral theory 
might be useful.184 Still others, most notably my colleague Andrew Moore,185 
have suggested compromise approaches that address many of Professor Breen’s 
concerns. 
Debates about the character of religiously affiliated law schools extend well 
beyond Jesuit schools. For example, some have argued that Catholic law schools 
must be radically restructured to embody a preferential option for the poor, as 
opposed to the preferential option for the rich that virtually all American law 
schools currently embody.186 Others take still more radical positions. For 
example, Thomas Shaffer has argued for “sectarian” law schools, meaning 
religiously affiliated law schools that stand separate from wider civil society in 
a variety of ways (think of the recent book The Benedict Option as applied to 
law schools!).187 Though a full discussion of his thought is beyond the scope of 
this article, one of Shaffer’s points merits mention: in contrast to American legal 
ethics and legal thinking, both religious ethics and feminist ethics are 
 
 183. Id. at 574-75. 
 184. See, e.g., Bryce, supra note 137. 
 185. Professor Moore is sympathetic to Professor Breen’s concerns, but does not think a 
required jurisprudence course would effectively address those concerns. Instead, he proposes both 
a “justice across the curriculum” requirement and an integrative seminar focused on justice; this 
seminar would be a capstone experience following (and directly connected to) a clinical experience. 
See Moore, supra note 137, at 470-73 (describing proposals). 
 186. See William Quigley, Seven Principles for Catholic Law Schools Serious about a 
Preferential Option for the Poor, 1 U. St. Thomas L.J. 128, 129 (2003) (setting out principles by 
which Catholic law schools may begin to embody a preferential option for the poor). The 
preferential option for the poor is a well-established principle of Catholic social teaching. See, e.g., 
Pope Francis, Evangelii Gaudium (2013) (available at http://w2.vatican.va/content/dam/francesco/ 
pdf/apost_exhortations/documents/papa-francesco_esortazione-ap_20131124_evangelii-gaudium 
_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/XH26-XMPP]) (“Without the preferential option for the poor, ‘the 
proclamation of the Gospel . . . risks being misunderstood or submerged.’”). 
 187. See Thomas L. Shaffer, Erastian and Sectarian Arguments in Religiously Affiliated Law 
Schools, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1859, 1869 (1993). Although Professor Shaffer’s article is twenty-five 
years old, it presages contemporary social arguments about the Christian community more 
generally. See, e.g., ROD DREHER, THE BENEDICT OPTION: A STRATEGY FOR CHRISTIANS IN A POST-
CHRISTIAN NATION (2017) (proposing a “strategic withdrawal” from the world by Christians in 
order to preserve Christian values and culture). 
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communal.188 I explore this insight more fully in the next section, which 
articulates my vision for legal education in the Mercy tradition. 
VI.  A VISION FOR LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE MERCY TRADITION 
Two major themes emerge from the source materials. The first, not 
surprising given the name of the congregation, is the primacy of mercifulness: 
Catherine McAuley believed mercy is the principal path by which we know God, 
and she structured her life around that belief; the congregation’s core values of 
compassionate service and social justice, as well as its articulation of the five 
Critical Concerns, attest to mercy’s centrality; the major thinkers about Mercy 
higher education also emphasize mercy. Thus, to be Mercy, a law school should 
be deeply committed to mercifulness. 
The second major theme is the centrality of women and girls. The Mercy 
congregation was founded in large part as a ministry to women and girls, and 
that mission has never changed. In short, an emphasis on women and girls is part 
of the Mercy charism, and any institution, including a School of Law, that exists 
under the sponsorship of the Sisters of Mercy should share that commitment. 
Minor themes augment the major themes. The most significant of the minor 
themes concerns the importance of identification in the process of professional 
formation. Catherine McAuley’s life work—the opening and operation of the 
House of Mercy—arose from her keen identification with poor women and girls, 
with those who cared for the poor, and with Jesus himself. Dr. Mary Sullivan 
points indirectly to the role of identification in formation when she asserts that 
an “effort to give good example” should define Mercy higher education; this 
statement recognizes that students will identify with us almost no matter what, 
so our own values and behavior—who we show ourselves to be—are as 
important to students’ professional identity formation as are the subjects we 
teach. Finally, in writing about Jesuit legal education, Professor Kalscheur 
prioritizes personal and professional formation—who both we and our students 
become through the educational process. Given these sources, I believe another 
mark of a Mercy legal education is careful attention to professional identity 
formation and to the role that preexisting identifications play in that process. 
What follows is a brief discussion of what these three commitments might 
mean within a law school. I have tried to resist the urge to address every question 
that may arise; this serves as a starting point. 
A. The Commitment to Mercifulness 
The first defining feature of a Mercy law school should be its commitment 
to mercy and mercifulness. 
 
 188. Shaffer, supra note 187, at 1873. 
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Like the word justice, mercy is open to varying interpretations. A full 
discussion of the many interpretive debates concerning mercy is beyond the 
scope of this article. For purposes of examining the charism of a Mercy law 
school, mercy within the Christian tradition is the appropriate starting point, and, 
even here, my examination will be quite brief. 
Within the Mercy universe,189 Dr. Jayme Hennessy has argued that mercy 
as Catherine McAuley practiced it is “the love that strives to restore or preserve 
the dignity of the human person.”190 Drawing on both Scripture and theological 
reflection,191 Dr. Hennessy asserts that human dignity is rooted in our creation 
in the Image of God.192 The mercy of Christ “restore[s] God’s image within the 
human person, and it [is] through works of mercy that this image of God [is] 
then reflected into the world.”193 To early Church theologians, the failure to 
practice mercy “obscured or impaired the humanity of both the person who was 
suffering and the person who failed to love—and to act.”194 In contrast, the 
practice of mercy—the active recognition of and love for the Image of God 
within another human—always requires the affirmation or restoration of human 
dignity. 
According to Dr. Hennessy, Catherine McAuley identified as a disciple of 
the “crucified Christ,” that is, of a God who “entered into the chaos, 
vulnerability, and suffering of human life to restore in our humanity the Image 
of God.”195 Catherine practiced this mercy by her care for and empowerment of 
destitute women and children, and by her care for those working alongside 
her.196 The Mercy Institute has continued this work through its ministries in 
education and health care and through its work on the Critical Concerns.197 Dr. 
Hennessy suggests that Mercy educational institutions can continue this work 
 
 189. Dr. Hennessy is a professor at Salve Regina, a Mercy institution located in Rhode Island. 
See Salve Regina, Dr. Jayme Hennessy, https://salve.edu/users/dr-jayme-hennessy [https://perma. 
cc/V94Z-NZJZ] (last accessed Aug. 20, 2018). 
 190. Jayme Hennessy, I Desire Mercy: The Theological Foundations for Examining the Role 
of Mercy in Higher Education, in Life Within the Stream of Mercy: Mission Development for 
Administration and Faculty 13, 16 (Conference for Mercy Higher Education 2009). This document 
was self-published by the Conference for Mercy Higher Education; the author of this article has on 
file a copy of Dr. Hennessy’s article. 
 191. Dr. Hennessy’s sources are wide-ranging and include, inter alia, the Bible (both Hebrew 
Scriptures and New Testament), several papal encyclicals, and writings from early Church 
theologian John Chrysostom, doctor of the Church Thomas Aquinas, liberation theologian Jon 
Sobrino, and feminist theologian Margaret Farley. Of course, a full discussion of mercy within the 
Christian tradition would merit its own library. However, Dr. Hennessy’s article focuses on the 
concept of mercy for purposes of Mercy higher education, the relevance of which is obvious. 
 192. Id. at 16. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. at 17. 
 196. See supra Part I (describing Catherine’s work with poor women and children). 
 197. See supra Part III (describing Critical Concerns). 
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through a process of formation such that students’ and employee’ “senses, 
emotions, mind, and will are disposed toward perceiving, feeling, thinking, and 
acting mercifully.”198 
Dr. Margaret Farley has explored the relationship between mercy and 
justice. Her central argument is that mercy “both requires justice and makes it 
possible.”199 (Note the similarity to Professor Robin West’s insight, infra, about 
the need for care to be just, and for justice to be caring.200) Describing mercy as 
a form of love, she notes that it can be helpful or harmful: what separates a 
helpful, just mercy from an unhelpful, unjust mercy is the “concrete reality of 
the beloved:”201 “[T]he requirement for true mercy is . . . the wisdom to 
understand well, insofar as we can, concrete realities, contexts, relationships, 
and the claims they make on us in justice.”202 
But just as mercy requires justice, mercy enables justice: 
Precisely because mercy involves beholding the value of others and suffering 
with them in their need, it opens reality to the beholder; it offers a way of 
“seeing” that evokes a moral response—to alleviate pain, provide assistance in 
need, support in wellbeing. Mercy therefore illuminates justice and propels it to 
action.203 
Finally, any discussion of mercy should include Jesuit theologian Jon 
Sobrino’s powerful reflections. His starting point is the role of mercy in the life 
of Jesus: Sobrino asserts that mercy was the central principle around which 
Jesus’ life was structured, and that, therefore, our lives should imitate that 
structure (if we wish to be fully human).204 Mercy should be our starting and 
ending points. However, properly understood, mercy connotes more than 
compassion, more than mere sentiment, and certainly is not paternalism. Rather, 
mercy is a basic attitude toward the suffering of another, whereby one reacts to 
eradicate that suffering for the sole reason that it exists, and in the conviction 
that, in this reaction to the ought-not-be of another’s suffering, one’s own being, 
without any possibility of subterfuge, hangs in the balance.205 
The call to mercy is unequivocal: there is nothing “that might relativize it or 
offer an escape from it.”206 And what mercy requires for the poor, the oppressed, 
and the outcast is radical: Jesus’ “‘social theory’ is guided by the principle that 
 
 198. Hennessy, supra note 190, at 20. 
 199. Farley, supra note 97, at 13. 
 200. See infra Part VI.B. 
 201. Farley, supra note 97, at 16. 
 202. Id. at 17. 
 203. Id. at 18. 
 204. SOBRINO, supra note 19, at 15–16 (“What we wish to set forth . . . is that the principle that 
seems to us to be the most ‘structuring’ of all, as we examine Jesus’ life, is the element of mercy in 
that life. Therefore it ought to be the ‘most structuring’ element of the life of the church, as well.”). 
 205. Id. at 18. 
 206. Id. 
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massive unjust suffering must be pulled up by the roots.”207 A church governed 
by the principle of mercy will have a “theoretical and practical obsession with 
indicating, and walking, effective paths to justice.”208 
Three insights strongly inform my view of what a commitment to 
mercifulness means for legal education. The first is the understanding of mercy 
as a love that works to preserve or restore human dignity. The second is the 
insight shared by Jon Sobrino and Margaret Farley about the reciprocal 
relationship of mercy to justice, especially the notion that mercy serves as the 
impetus for persons to seek justice for others; in a sense, mercy precedes justice. 
The third is related to the second: justice and care are interdependent, that is, 
uncaring justice is unjust and unjust caring is uncaring.209  
These insights imply the following for a law school: students must be able 
to see the crucified peoples of our society and world, that is, those whose dignity 
has been denied. Just as Catherine McAuley placed the House of Mercy in a 
wealthy area of Dublin, thus making the poor and their suffering impossible for 
the rich to ignore, so must we ensure that suffering—especially human suffering 
related directly to our legal system—is visible to our students. Seeing the 
crucified peoples, students also must care; this is an affective experience and, at 
times, an experience of identification. Finally, this seeing and caring should lead 
to action: students should work to take the crucified people down from the cross 
(which requires wisdom, education, and discernment).  
Keeping these insights in mind, I offer some tentative and small suggestions 
for how a law school in the Mercy tradition might fulfill its core commitment to 
mercifulness. 
1. Reform of the First Year Curriculum 
Most importantly, formation in mercifulness should begin with the first-year 
curriculum. Recall Dr. Hennessy’s argument that Mercy education should form 
persons who are disposed to perceive, feel, think, and act mercifully. Students 
frequently are powerfully moved and deepened by their encounters with human 
suffering during their clinical and externship experiences. Students’ journals in 
externship courses bear witness to the profound influence of encounters with 
suffering, deprivation, and injustice: 
My job site is in the . . . Hall of Justice where legal issues pertaining to . . . 
County Youth are adjudicated. I am not sure if you have ever been to the . . . 
Hall of Justice, but it is a pretty depressing place for a number of reasons. First, 
the building is almost entirely in disrepair . . . the air conditioning was out all 
week (with an indefinite repair date), the elevators do not work (another 
indefinite repair date), and I have yet to find a bathroom where at least one of 
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the stall doors has not been kicked in. The second reason I found this place to be 
depressing is due to the reasons that people are there in the first place. Because 
this courthouse deals only in juvenile matters, it stands to reason that most of 
[the] people that are there because their family has hit rock bottom in one way 
or another. On my first day, one of the attorneys invited me down to observe her 
delinquency hearing. During the hearing, in marched two young boys (brothers). 
My heart broke for their mother who cried while listening to the bad things her 
sons had done. 
This theme continued throughout the week. I observed a trial where a mother 
lost rights to her three-year old son. I was the representative . . . during case 
discussions for children on the mental health docket. I completed case intakes 
for two boys involved in the criminal justice system, but also have learning 
disabilities that have impeded their ability to complete school. After each of 
these experiences, I had to wonder if the disrepair of the courthouse had become 
of [sic] reflection of the desolation.210 
This week one of the tasks I was asked to assist with was listening to multiple 
discs of jail calls and take notes of anytime the defendant (or the person he 
called) discussed his case. . . . At first listening to the calls was no big deal; 
however, as the calls progressed to later dates and more time elapsed since he 
had been incarcerated, the more stressed he sounded. What really got me though 
was after one of his court dates, he was talking to various people on the phone 
as to whether or not he should take the plea deal he was offered which would 
result in a minimum of 10 years of time versus rolling the dice with multiple . . . 
charges and a habitual offender. During one of the calls he started to cry and 
breakdown that if he took the plea he wouldn’t be out until after his son (approx. 
7 years old) graduated high school. He genuinely sounded devastated at the 
thought of this and it really broke my heart to hear, especially knowing that little 
boy would be going the rest of his life without his dad around and that the mother 
would be having to deal with all the repercussions of that. It really caused me to 
reflect on that criminals are still human beings, granted some of them are pretty 
messed up human beings with a whole host of issues that cause them to engage 
in the behaviors that they do but they are still people with emotions and feelings. 
It has to be hard to be a prosecutor and finding inner peace and a balance between 
seeking justice and being able to make tough decisions in doing their job. This 
guy was a “bad guy” with a really nasty history but at his core, he is still a dad 
to a little boy who was missing his dad, not understanding why he couldn’t see 
him or when he was coming home. Two days later that defendant came into 
court and had decided to take the plea deal. As I sat and watched the proceeding, 
I couldn’t help but feel a little sad for his family. Meeting the victim afterward 
was just as depressing when I heard that she had been turning to pills to cope 
with the mental anguish she had suffered for the last year and a half as a result 
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of [the crime] . . . and that her pill use prevents her from being the mother she 
wants to be to her little girl.211 
These confrontations with suffering can be painful, even wounding, but they 
deepen students’ appreciation of the complexities and tragedies routinely 
encountered in legal practice. Both students and lawyers can grow callous, but 
with good guidance, the experiences can also result in greater humility, 
compassion, and commitment, not to mention a deeper understanding of the 
operation of law.  
Some form of these encounters should be part of the first-year curriculum. 
For example, at least one of the required first-year courses each semester could 
incorporate some form of course-related service learning and guided reflection 
on the service learning experience. Service learning would attach human faces 
to the doctrines students learn in class: reading about unconscionability is one 
thing; doing an intake for an elderly, illiterate man on a fixed income who was 
targeted for a small loan at 300% interest gives the doctrine a fuller meaning. 
Students may overlook a crucified person in a case book; that’s just part of the 
“facts” section of their brief for class. Students rarely will overlook a crucified 
person directly in their path. In short, service learning allows students to see 
those who are suffering. Placing these experiences within required courses, with 
faculty working side-by-side with students, models for students the virtue and 
care we wish to cultivate in them and ourselves. And such experiences take 
students outside themselves and thus may serve as a powerful corrective for the 
pathologies of the first year: the obsession with grades and status relative to 
peers, as well as the attendant anxiety and depression students too often suffer.  
Other experiences during the first year also may cultivate students’ 
mercifulness. Field trips to court, especially criminal court, are always powerful. 
Guest speakers—lawyers and judges, to be sure, but also parties to civil and 
criminal litigation—show students that legal disputes are human disputes 
involving real people worthy of their attention and compassion. And of course 
there are opportunities for one-day clinics—for example, our institution has one-
day driver’s license restoration clinics—and service days. All of these 
experiences nicely augment curricular service learning opportunities. 
Opportunities for reflection should accompany service learning and related 
experiences. (Reflection should play a greater role in the law school curriculum 
more generally.) Among other things, guided reflection gives students tools for 
coping constructively with the emotional demands of direct encounters with 
suffering, need, and injustice, and allows students to see connections between 
their past experiences and who they are becoming professionally. Reflection is 
both cognitive and affective, and some focus on students’ affective experiences 
may not only help develop students’ capacity for both compassion and self-
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knowledge, but may also help students integrate their own emotional and moral 
compasses into their professional identities. One hopes this greater integration 
would, in turn, reduce the prevalence of substance abuse, anxiety, and 
depression among law students and within the world of practice. 
There are two major objections to incorporating service learning into the 
first-year curriculum. The first is practical: there isn’t enough time given all the 
material students must learn. The second echoes Professor Breen’s concern 
about learning about justice merely by taking clinics: service learning may risk 
developing students with warm hearts but empty heads, with no real 
understanding of what justice requires in any particular situation. 
I am sympathetic to the concern about time, but this concern always exists. 
Professors who teach courses in the first-year curriculum constantly must choose 
between breadth versus depth of coverage, and this is another version of that 
choice. If we want mercifulness to be part of students’ professional identity 
formation, then such formation should begin during the first year, which most 
would say is the most transformative portion of students’ formal legal education. 
Especially during the first year, students absorb our values and priorities, and 
relegating formation in mercifulness to upper level clinics represents a lost 
opportunity: too little, too late. 
I am less sympathetic to the concern about warm hearts and empty heads. 
Frankly, the greater risk during law school is that we form lawyers with clever 
heads and cold hearts, or lawyers whose heads and hearts are alienated, operating 
on parallel tracks. Incorporating affectively-loaded experiences during the first 
year is a move in the right direction. Moreover, the incorporation of service 
learning into required courses addresses Professor Breen’s concerns: students’ 
service to others takes place within the context of in-depth examination of 
doctrine and of the justice of such doctrines. In fact, direct encounters with 
persons with legal difficulties spur deep thought about the operation of legal 
doctrines, in a way that too rarely happens when students learn doctrines as part 
of regular classroom instruction. 
A commitment to mercifulness suggests other tweaks to the first-year 
curriculum. For example, criminal law professors may consider augmenting the 
standard discussion of retribution and deterrence with consideration of forms of 
restorative justice such as those practiced within some Native American 
communities. It also suggests alterations to the upper level curriculum, most 
notably a greater focus on alternative dispute resolution. 
2. A Greater Focus on Alternative Dispute Resolution  
A second way to fulfill the Mercy commitment to mercifulness is through 
an increased focus on alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”), especially 
mediation. 
The assumption that litigation within an adversarial system is lawyers’ 
principal method for addressing clients’ problems is built into the very structure 
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of legal education. Students begin law school by learning to read cases—stories 
of disputes that were resolved only through litigation. 
Of course, students learn soon enough that few cases go to trial, for reasons 
both healthy and problematic. In clinics, externships, and summer work 
experiences, they see how often cooperation and civility between lawyers is the 
norm, and they also see how often cases settle. They learn the costs—financial 
and emotional—that parties bear during scorched earth litigation. 
A commitment to mercifulness does not necessarily require a focus on 
mediation, as litigation itself is sometimes necessary to restore a party to dignity, 
but such a focus is consistent with an orientation toward mercy. Restoration to 
dignity includes, when possible, reconciliation of relationships and mending of 
broken communities. This can happen through litigation, but mediation is a 
natural fit. An extensive discussion of this is beyond the scope of this article, but 
some upper-level experiences in ADR, whether through training in ADR skills 
or through consideration of issues in doctrinal classes through an ADR lens, 
would further students’ formation as merciful lawyers. It is also consistent with 
a commitment to nonviolence, which is one of the Critical Concerns. 
3. Concrete Work on the Critical Concerns 
Finally, a commitment to mercifulness should include academic focus and 
community work on the Mercy Institute’s Critical Concerns. Each concern seeks 
to address an area in which the recognition and restoration of human dignity is 
a matter of special urgency. The Sisters of Mercy have discerned that these 
concerns should shape their thought and social action. A School of Law under 
Mercy sponsorship needn’t reinvent the wheel, as each subject presents rich 
opportunity for study and action. A distribution requirement would allow 
students to choose the concern of special interest and urgency to them (say, 
immigration law) and learn more deeply about the legal issues in that area. 
But clinics and other courses aren’t enough. For example, a course on 
Critical Race Theory cannot substitute for a larger institutional commitment to 
racial equity. This is true of gender as well, as the next section will discuss. 
B. The Commitment to Women and Girls 
A special commitment to the wellbeing of women, girls, and other 
vulnerable groups is a sine qua non for legal education in the Mercy tradition.212 
Moreover, this commitment is wide ranging and begins with curriculum. 
 
 212. Notably, my research has not revealed any American law school whose Mission Statement 
or other statements of central commitments included a special commitment to the wellbeing of 
women and girls. A commitment to women and girls should not preclude a strong commitment to 
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1. Curriculum 
First, the curriculum should reflect this commitment to women and girls. Of 
course, the curriculum should include courses like Feminist Legal Theory, 
Women and the Law, and so forth. More importantly, though, if faculty members 
share a deep commitment to women and girls, then traditional women’s concerns 
likely will be visible in standard doctrinal courses. Is domestic violence, one of 
the society’s most common crimes, taught in the Criminal Law course? Is rape, 
and if so, how?213 Prostitution and sex work? Do courses in human rights include 
coverage of issues principally affecting women, such as female genital 
mutilation, human trafficking, etc.? And so forth.214 
However, focusing on discrete issues disproportionately affecting women 
and girls is not enough. Rather, students also should be exposed to critiques of 
and challenges to the lens through which American culture, political institutions, 
and laws view such issues. As Robin West and others have recognized, the rules 
of the American legal system have failed to adequately protect women in large 
part because of the system’s conception of the person:  
The “connected individual” [connected as a caregiver, in an intimate relationship 
with a spouse, etc.] . . . is simply not the subject of modern political and legal 
thought any more than she is the subject of political and legal protection . . . . 
[M]ainstream liberal theory, as well as the liberal legalism which is its outgrowth 
in the legal academy, is premised upon an individual who prides himself on his 
autonomy and on his self-chosen life projects . . . . It is that profoundly 
 
Mercy, any Mercy institution, including a Mercy law school, should have an easily recognizable 
commitment to women and girls. 
Many law schools, whether religiously affiliated or not, express commitments to specific groups or 
causes. For example, the Mission Statement of Howard University School of Law focuses (albeit 
not exclusively) on the rights of African-Americans and other minority groups: 
Consistent with providing the professional leadership necessary to advocate and defend the 
rights of all, but particularly of African-Americans and other minorities, it is the Law 
School’s mission to . . . [e]ngage as an institution in the active pursuit of solutions to 
domestic and international legal, social, economic and political problems that are of 
particular concern to minority groups. 
Our Mission, HOW. UNIV. SCH. OF L., http://law.howard.edu/content/our-mission [https://perma. 
cc/3M82-EAXW] (last accessed Nov. 10, 2018) (emphasis added). A law school in the Mercy 
tradition might have a similar express commitment to women’s rights. 
 213. All too often Criminal Law professors decline to teach the law of rape, largely out of 
discomfort with the subject matter and with the ambiguity of the law itself. See Jennifer M. 
Denbow, The Pedagogy of Rape Law: Objectivity, Identity and Emotion, 64 J. LEGAL EDUC. 16, 
16–17 (2014) (discussing professors’ omission of rape law and the reasons for that omission). 
 214. None of this is to suggest a limitation on faculty academic freedom. There can be 
principled reasons not to cover certain topics. However, all too often, the omission of topics from 
standard case books is a result of the invisibility or unfamiliarity of those topics to the drafters of 
the books, or perhaps an unexamined assumption that the topics simply aren’t legally interesting or 
important. This article simply suggests that professors consider critically, and in the light of gender 
equity, their default settings about what should and shouldn’t be covered. 
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disconnected individual which liberal societies, liberal politics, and liberal 
ideologies, including legal ones, are designed to protect.215 
Differently put, although a greater emphasis on, say, domestic violence may be 
somewhat useful, the law’s inadequate treatment of this issue will not simply 
change through more attention. Rather, for true reform to occur, American law’s 
conception of the human person must broaden and abandon its radical 
individualism. 
Many schools of thought—such as communitarianism—challenge the 
radically individualistic rights-oriented assumptions of American legal thought 
and doctrine. A Mercy-affiliated law school that is characterized by a special 
commitment to women and girls might (or should) consistently use the tools and 
insights of feminism/womanism/mujerista to critique and, at times, advocate for 
the reform of, American legal doctrine. 
Of course, there are many schools of feminist and womanist thought.216 The 
insights of relational feminism,217 especially when combined with some of the 
insights of both radical and intersectional feminism, provide some of the most 
incisive feminist critiques of American law.  
Relational feminism became prominent in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s 
within the fields of psychology and moral philosophy.218 Lawrence Kohlberg’s 
studies of moral decision-making had implied that girls’ moral decision making 
was less developed than that of boys.219 Psychologist Carol Gilligan studied 
Kohlberg’s data, girls’ and boys’ explanations for their moral reasoning, etc., 
and ultimately concluded that many girls operate from a moral paradigm that 
Kohlberg simply had not recognized: an ethic of care, that is, a perspective that 
assumed as a starting point the connectedness of persons and the primacy of care 
for others as a moral value.220 For Gilligan, this “ethic of care” represented a 
moral perspective that competed with, or was at least distinct from, the “ethic of 
justice” that served as Kohlberg’s norm for moral thought.221 Although men can 
 
 215. WEST, supra note 55, at 4. 
 216. Just as obviously, some such schools of thought stand in direct contrast—even active 
opposition—to Catholic or even more broadly Christian precepts. This shouldn’t matter at a 
university, especially given the emphasis within the Catholic intellectual tradition of engaging all 
voices and perspectives in the search for truth and the quest for justice. 
 217. This is also sometimes called cultural feminism. Catherine Albiston et al., Feminism in 
Relation, 17 WIS. WOMEN’S L. J. 1, 3 n.8 (2002). 
 218. See, e.g., CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND 
WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT 1–2 (1982) (arguing that women’s emotional and moral development 
have been ignored in psychological and other research). 
 219. Id. at 18 (“Prominent among those who thus appear to be deficient in moral development 
when measured by Kohlberg’s scale are women, whose judgments seem to exemplify the third 
stage of his six-stage sequence. At this stage morality is conceived in interpersonal terms and 
goodness is equated with helping and pleasing others.”). 
 220. Id. at 173. 
 221. Id. at 173–74. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2019] LAW SCHOOL IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 439 
operate from an ethic of care and women from an ethic of justice, and people 
may operate from either at various times, Gilligan and other relational feminists 
posited that generally women are more likely than men to operate from this ethic 
of care.222  
Within the legal academy, Georgetown professor Robin West is probably 
the most prominent voice for applying the insights of relational feminism to 
American law.223 Her starting point is a conception of people not as wholly and 
radically autonomous individuals but as “connected selves:” 
We know . . . that . . . connections to others and to our social worlds are 
important, and even central, to our identity. . . . Connections to others give us 
pleasure, they give our lives content, direction, and structure, and more than any 
other experience we share, they inform and constitute our “moral sense.”224 
These connections are not invariably positive and can, in fact, be the source of 
some of our greatest harms: rape (including marital rape), domestic violence, 
and child abuse.225 Some threats and harms to our connections are natural—
physical illness, death—but, as Professor West and others recognize, many are 
culturally specific consequences of political and legal forces.226 As described 
above, one great source of threat and harm is American law’s radically 
individualistic view of the human person, which, in the view of West and others, 
is “all a function of our sorry history of sexist exclusion: we have excluded 
women’s . . . interests and voices from our political and legal history, and thus 
have unsurprisingly failed to protect women from the harms they 
disproportionately suffer within damaging relations of connection.”227 
Beyond her positions that the “connected individual” is essentially invisible 
within American law and that women, more than men, suffer from this 
invisibility, West’s feminist analysis of American law rests on two assumptions: 
first, that the “ethic of care” is a “principled moral stance, rather than an affective 
emotional response, and therefore [is] . . . of importance in all areas of life 
[including the political and legal spheres], and not just the familial;”228 and 
 
 222. Cf. id. at 173 (“Yet in the different voice of women lies the truth of an ethic of care, the 
tie between relationship and responsibility, and the origins of aggression in the failure of 
connection.”). 
 223. In a review of Caring for Justice, Michael Cahill described the book as a “provocative 
foray into new territory.” See Michael T. Cahill, Book Review, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1884, 1884 (1998). 
 224. WEST, supra note 55, at 1. 
 225. Id. at 2 (“Obviously, while some of the ‘connections’ that tie us to others are life-affirming, 
others are invasive and overpowering. They diminish rather than enlarge the individuals who 
participate in them.”). 
 226. Id. at 3. 
 227. Id. at 7. 
 228. Id. at 6 (emphasis added); see also id. at 9 (“[I]f it is true . . . that the act of caring for 
others to whom we are connected in some way is central to our moral lives, then our capacity for 
care should be at the center of our understanding of our public and legal, as well as private and 
personal, virtues, and specifically that it should be central to the meaning of legal justice.”). 
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second, that women’s subordination within American culture is the principal 
cause of the invisibility of the connected self and of the public irrelevance of an 
ethic of care.229 The invisibility of the “connected individual” and the exclusion 
of a moral “ethic of care” from public discussions has not merely harmed 
women. Rather, West proposes, the harm is also “to our law, our understanding 
of the nature of harm and sense of justice.”230  
Proceeding from these assumptions, West’s thesis is jurisprudential: “Our 
justice is not just when it is not caring, and care is not caring when it is not 
just.”231 The first chapter of Caring for Justice is devoted to exploring and 
defending this claim.232 (Professor West’s thesis calls to mind Dr. Margaret 
Farley’s argument that mercy both requires justice and makes justice 
possible.233) 
A law school in the Mercy tradition may not accept relational feminism’s234 
critique of American law, but, at the very least, it should engage feminist 
perspectives on law and on justice. 
Furthermore, though not necessarily religious, the relational feminist 
perspective is at least a first cousin to much of Catholic social teaching and to 
the perspectives of Catholic social teaching on the human person. Often women 
are justifiably nervous when clerical types begin talking about gender—I sure as 
hell am!—but the insights of relational feminism are consistent with the starting 
point of Catholic social teaching: the common good.235 Discussion of the 
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 234. Critics of relational feminism argue—correctly, I believe—that it is an essentialist 
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somewhat different language, it takes the “connected individual”—not the radically autonomous 
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from the fact that he exists ‘with’ others and ‘for’ others.” Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, 
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common good within Catholic social teaching reveals a focus on the “connected 
individual,” not the radically autonomous individual of American law.236 
Furthermore, the clear position of Catholic social teaching is that all persons—
both women and men—are responsible for the health of public life, that is, for 
working to achieve the common good. Moreover, Pope John Paul II’s Mulieris 
Dignitatem237 implies that women’s voices in law and government are necessary 
to achieve a balanced, healthy society.  
Several possibilities exist for the incorporation of feminist critiques of 
American law. One is simply to incorporate such perspectives within the 
standard law school curriculum; indeed, this should happen. Another—with a 
nod to Professor Breen—is to include the materials in a jurisprudence course. 
Another might be through a distribution requirement that could include any 
number of courses (Jurisprudence, Feminist Legal Theory, even an externship). 
Yet another might be more organic: have some sessions for interested faculty 
members and let things develop as they will. 
2. Institutional Culture 
A Mercy law school’s curriculum and scholarship should reflect a serious 
commitment to the wellbeing of women and to the inclusion of their 
perspectives. However, the institution’s commitment to women’s wellbeing 
should not merely be intellectual. Our students may hear what we say, but they 
believe, absorb, and appropriate what we do. Therefore, the school’s institutional 
culture should genuinely value women, take affirmative steps to ensure gender 
equity, and question and ultimately dismantle institutional structures that 
disadvantage women. But how? 
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Robin West’s insights about the radical individualism of American law also 
apply to the cultures of American law schools. Just as American law “is 
premised upon an individual who prides himself on his autonomy and on his 
self-chosen life projects,”238 so too are American law schools. And just as 
American law protects and values the radically autonomous individual self, not 
the connected self it hardly recognizes, American law schools principally value 
the radically autonomous individual self over the connected self. And all too 
often this means law schools overvalue the contributions of a select few radically 
autonomous, mostly male faculty members over other, often female faculty 
members who operate more as “connected selves”—connected to students and 
to the institution itself. 
A Mercy institution should privilege its identity as a community, rejecting 
the highly individualistic “star system”239 prevalent in American academia. This 
focus on law school as an intellectual and professional community is consistent 
with the promotion of women’s wellbeing, with Catholic social teaching’s 
commitment to the common good, and with the Mercy Institute’s identification 
of community as one of its core values. But what does it mean to value 
community and to reject the star system, and why is this consistent with 
institutional justice toward women?  
The star system influences all of legal academia, even modestly ranked law 
schools, and even in a post-crash era. Of course, all schools seek eminent 
scholars: such persons may benefit the institution in a variety of ways, most 
notably by increasing the reputation of a department. Schools should seek such 
persons, and, at times and to a limited extent, higher pay, course releases, and 
similar benefits may be appropriate means for recognizing high achievement and 
for allowing an especially talented scholar to focus on an important project. 
However, this recognition of excellence is distinct from what is meant by 
the star system. The star system is characterized by “vast inequities in salary, 
other perks, and teaching loads,”240 with “stars” who all too often see themselves 
as “individual entrepreneur[s] rather than member[s] of a community.”241  
An extreme version of the star system may be problematic at any institution. 
Some critics assert that although “stars” may serve as marketing tools for their 
institutions, they often teach relatively few students, so any actual direct 
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educational benefit may be illusory or at least overstated.242 In short, although 
stars may “bring visibility and luster[,] they also bring special deals, special—
in the sense of privileged—rules of conduct, and discord, and jealousy.”243 At 
its worst, the star system “is destructive of faculty morale and of the kind of 
community in which the satisfactory functioning of a college . . . depends.”244 
However, beyond all of these criticisms, which could apply at any law 
school, the star system in its present form is fundamentally incompatible with 
the Mercy commitment to the wellbeing of women.245 There are several reasons 
for this. 
First, as an empirical matter, very few female faculty members, and even 
fewer who are also people of color, are identified as stars and receive the 
extraordinary privileges that accompany the star system. Take one example from 
Canada: In 2010, the Canadian government allowed several public universities 
to hire nineteen “academic stars,” none of whom were women; indeed, not even 
one of the thirty-six nominees on the shortlist were women.246 The issue in the 
United States—and in American law schools—doesn’t appear to be very 
different. 
This gender difference in “stars” seems likely to be, at least in part, a product 
of structural discrimination: some combination of implicit bias and old boy-ism. 
Professor Richard Delgado’s words, spoken in a slightly different context more 
than thirty years ago, still ring true: 
It does not matter where one enters this universe; one comes to the same result: 
an inner circle of about a dozen white, male writers who comment on, take polite 
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issue with, extol, criticize, and expand on each other’s ideas. It is something like 
an elaborate minuet.247 
The research of Virginia Valian and others248 shows how implicit bias results in 
the underrating of the intellectual contributions of women and the considerably 
lower odds that a woman will be identified as a rising or actual star. One see 
signs of this throughout academia: a study of student evaluations shows that men 
are referred to as “smart” and women as “helpful.”249 These biases are most 
influential when criteria for evaluation of work product are inherently 
unclear250—certainly the case in legal scholarship. In short, the star system 
harms women in part because, whatever the merits of their work, women are less 
likely to be identified and receive the benefits of the system. 
Second, sexual harassment appears to be more prevalent in workplaces 
characterized by a star system, and sexual harassment obviously is inconsistent 
with a serious commitment to women’s wellbeing. One reason that Bill 
O’Reilly, Matt Lauer, and other prominent media figures were allowed to get 
away with sexual harassment for years (with multiple targets and victims) is 
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precisely star culture.251 Academia is not immune to this dynamic, as scandals 
at the University of California-Berkeley252 and elsewhere show. 
But the star system is not antithetical to a Mercy law school’s commitment 
to women merely because of the paucity of female stars and a potentially 
increased risk of sexual harassment. Even if there were an equal gender 
distribution of perceived stars and even absent an increased risk of sexual 
harassment, the star system, at least in its exaggerated form, has no place at a 
Mercy institution. 
The third reason a Mercy institution must reject the star system is, in fact, 
the most important. The central assumption of the star system is a radical 
individualism: as four Canadian professors have said, the “essence of the star 
system is to romanticize individual performers while (and by) underplaying the 
contributing role of their teams, institutions, and other support networks.”253 But 
this radical individualism runs counter not only to relational and most other 
schools of feminism by undervaluing the “connected self,” but also to the 
Christian view of the person. A Mercy institution’s Christian identity need not 
mean every student and employee accepts, say, the divinity of Jesus, but such an 
institution should operate out of a roughly Christian anthropology in which 
faculty members exist in community with one another, the administration, and 
students. A narcissism-infused celebrity culture—with an intellectual patina, no 
doubt, but devaluing an ethic of care—betrays Catherine McAuley’s vision, 
which privileges community building over lone wolfing and self-bestowal over 
self-aggrandizement. 
This statement of the value of community does not explain how to achieve 
such a community. Hiring for mission plays a role. Institutional incentives and 
standards play a role. Decanal modeling and commitment play a role. 
Importantly, though, privileging community over individual stardom will 
not, by itself, ensure the wellbeing of women, people of color, and other 
vulnerable members of the institution. A law school committed to the wellbeing 
of women and girls will engage in continuous study and self-examination about 
its own policies and practices with regard to administrators, faculty, and 
 
 251. Jena McGregor, How Too Much Focus on “Superstar” Workers Enables Harassment, 
WASHINGTON POST (Dec. 17, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/on-leadership/wp/ 
2017/12/19/the-metoo-movement-is-a-warning-sign-about-the-star-system-at-many-companies 
/?utm_term=.dd22c2ff2e82 [https://perma.cc/39HK-YU5Y] (last accessed Nov. 23, 2018). 
 252. See, e.g., Colleen Flaherty, Another Berkeley Star Accused, INSIDER HIGHER ED (March 
24, 2017), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/03/24/berkeley-again-accused-protecting-
reputation-star-professor-instead-acting-reports [https://perma.cc/4C9U-MY84] (last accessed 
Nov. 23, 2018). 
 253. Patricia Rae, Mark Jones, Annette Burfoot, & Frank Burke, Failed by the “Star” System, 
WORD PRESS, https://qufa.wordpress.com/2010/06/22/caut-bulletin-failed-by-the-’star’-system/ 
[https://perma.cc/M339-SEVN] (June 22, 2010) (last accessed Nov. 23, 2018). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
446 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:401 
students.254 It is simply not enough to hire both women and men as 
administrators and faculty, or to admit female and male students to the school, 
and then assume everyone will rise or fall on their own merit. (Note the whole 
“rise and fall” notion is itself deeply individualistic.)  
Such an assumption is belied by a considerable body of psychological, 
sociological, and organizational research. The more accurate assumption is that 
unless an institution takes affirmative steps, our defaults will disadvantage 
women and persons of color in important ways. This is true in part because most 
of us—whether male, female, or differently gendered—operate from preexisting 
schemas regarding male and female traits and roles. Without structures to correct 
for this bias, most of us will fall into patterns that hamper the professional 
development and minimize the professional contributions of women, especially 
women of color. Take just a few examples: 
a) Service work: Cassandra Guarino and Victor Borden—among others—
have documented relatively large discrepancies in the amount of time 
female and male academics devote to service responsibilities.255 
Notably, women engage in considerably more internal institutional 
service work—recruitment of students and other significant committee 
work—than do men.256 Although this service work is essential to the 
successful operation of an academic institution—it is what one might 
consider “connected self” work—the available research (not to mention 
what everyone kind of knows) indicates service work doesn’t matter 
much in tenure or promotion.257 
b) Systematic Undervaluing of the Intelligence and Intellectual Potential of 
Female Faculty Members/Systematic Overvaluing of the Intelligence 
and Intellectual Potential of Male Faculty Members: Basic research on 
implicit bias strongly suggests that men in the legal academy will be 
identified as smart and promising in a way that is far less likely for 
women.258 And, in fact, the available research suggests this is exactly the 
case as regards a variety of metrics that play a major role in determining 
 
 254. This should be true of race as well. 
 255. Cassandra Guarino, Why Higher Education Needs to Get Rid of the Gender Gap for 
Academic Housekeeping, THE CONVERSATION, http://theconversation.com/why-higher-ed-needs-
to-get-rid-of-the-gender-gap-for-academic-housekeeping-82135 [https://perma.cc/BGC4-ZY4K] 
(Sept. 27, 2017) (summarizing a study reported in the journal Research in Higher Education) (last 
accessed Nov. 23, 2018). 
 256. I do not know whether this is true at law schools, but I have no reason to believe law 
schools are any different from other segments of academia. 
 257. Guarino, supra note 255. 
 258. See VALIAN, supra note 248, at 128 (describing, inter alia, studies of ratings of CVs and 
of academic papers in which identical CVs and papers were rated more highly if the documents 
were attributed to a male). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2019] LAW SCHOOL IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 447 
the career trajectory of a legal academic.259 A few examples will make 
the point: 
c) Article Selection and Citation Count: It is hardly news to anyone in legal 
academia that the process for selecting law review articles for publication 
is odd, even perverse. Indeed, law is virtually the only field in which 
apprentices—students—serve as gatekeepers for intellectual discourse 
within a discipline.260 Research has already suggested that the selection 
process strongly privileges professors at more elite schools, without 
regard to the quality of work product: because student editors lack the 
background to understand which articles might make a major 
contribution, they use prestige—whether of a professor’s home 
institution, of the law school the professor attended, or of the prestige of 
those listed in the acknowledgements—as a proxy for the quality of the 
piece.261 Now add to that what we know about implicit gender and racial 
bias, and one can see the problem. Research in a variety of fields has 
long shown that academic CVs are rated more highly when associated 
with a male name.262 If this is true in the hard sciences, where criteria for 
quality are presumably clearer than in a field like law, then one should 
expect this to be even more true in law. And although the research is not 
complete, that appears to be the case: in his article describing implicit 
bias in article selection, Professor Higdon points to research by Professor 
Minna Kotkin suggesting female scholars are underrepresented in the 
“best” journals,263 and there is other evidence of gender (and racial, 
although there is less research on that point) discrimination in the article 
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selection process.264 This matters for a variety of reasons. As Professor 
Higdon points out, the current selection process “discourages 
creativity[,] . . . undermines diversity of voice[,] . . . [and] marginalizes 
practical skills scholarship.”265 More to the point, for my purposes, this 
state of affairs is bad for female faculty and administrators at law 
schools, bad for female students, and, in fact, bad for women outside the 
legal profession. The ways in which it is bad for female employees and 
students are obvious. As for women outside the legal profession, it is bad 
for them if one assumes that female law professors are more likely than 
are men to write about issues disproportionately affecting women. If this 
writing receives less attention, particularly in prominent journals, then 
legal and social reform benefitting women is less likely. 
d) Student Evaluations: As briefly described above, studies of student 
evaluations further a picture of good male professors as “brilliant” or 
“smart;” good female professors are “accessible” and “helpful.”266 In 
particular, the available social science research suggests that women’s 
evaluations tend to be lower than men’s in large lecture-style classes, 
probably because men are merely expected to be agentic whereas women 
are also expected to be sensitive and nurturing.267 In fact, most research 
on teaching evaluations shows that evaluations are based primarily on 
professors’ non-verbal behavior, rather than any material taught, and that 
the connection with learning outcomes is questionable at best.268 
Furthermore, all too many students use anonymous teaching evaluations 
as a “safe” forum to express their own conscious and unconscious racism 
and sexism.269 Yet despite the strong evidence that standard student 
evaluations of teaching reflect gender and racial bias, especially in large 
classes, and despite the weak evidence of any correlation between strong 
teaching evaluations and student learning, these student evaluations are 
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used in decision making regarding tenure and promotion and in 
consideration for teaching awards and other awards for faculty 
excellence. Moreover, they both reflect and shape perceptions of faculty 
members’ intellectual abilities. 
Given what we know about our biased defaults, a law school with a 
commitment to women’s wellbeing should take steps to minimize such bias. A 
Mercy law school should be on the cutting edge of these issues.  
3. Student Services 
A Mercy law school’s special commitment to women, children, and the most 
vulnerable in society should be apparent in various policies related to 
admissions, financial aid, and student affairs. 
As Brian Tamanaha and others have pointed out,270 law schools’ scholarship 
funds frequently are awarded to the most affluent students, who are more likely 
to have received the kind of education and enrichment that translate into higher 
LSAT scores and undergraduate grades. The practical result is that less affluent 
and academically more vulnerable students in effect subsidize the educations of 
wealthier, often academically better prepared students.271 
I do not harbor utopian fantasies of a dramatic change in this state of affairs, 
particularly in an era of keen competition for strong students and at tuition-
dependent institutions. However, fundraising for scholarships for a variety of 
vulnerable students—women and men in the first generation of their families to 
attend college or professional school, single parents, working parents, and so 
forth—should be a clear priority for both mission-related and practical reasons. 
Obviously such scholarships further the Mercy commitment to ensuring that 
women, children, and other vulnerable populations acquire skills that will allow 
them to be self-sufficient and to advocate for others. Moreover, such assistance 
is likely to increase such students’ academic performance and professional 
prospects by alleviating a major source of stress, namely how to pay for school. 
Similarly, a Mercy law school might seek ways to alleviate the burden of 
child care for its students. This could take a variety of different forms, ranging 
from grants to subsidize child care to partnerships with nearby child care 
providers that might provide a group discount to something involving an even 
greater commitment, such as operating a day care center on site. Again, the 
school’s location, funds, and other practical factors would dictate what such an 
institution might be able to provide, but a commitment to family-friendly 
policies and practices should be apparent at the institution. 
Student Affairs policies and practices should reflect a similar commitment. 
For example, some student affairs and career services programming might be 
devoted to the concerns of non-traditional students. A career services office 
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might consider maintaining a clothing bank for those who lack money for 
appropriate interview attire. This is not intended to be prescriptive. Rather, the 
Mercy law school must discern the actual needs of its most vulnerable students, 
including but not limited to women, and build programming around those needs.  
A special commitment to women and girls and a focus on mercifulness are 
the principal hallmarks of a law school in the Mercy tradition. However, a law 
school in the Mercy tradition also should be characterized by an emphasis on 
professional identity formation.  
C. Professional Identity Formation 
A concern for professional identity formation is not limited to law schools 
in the Mercy tradition or, for that matter, to religiously affiliated law schools. 
Rather, professional identity formation—the process by which students 
appropriate for themselves the values of the legal profession at its best272—is a 
concern for all law schools. This has been clear since 2007, when the Carnegie 
Report273 was published. The Carnegie Report identified three apprenticeships 
that should comprise part of legal education: a cognitive apprenticeship 
(“thinking like a lawyer”); a skills and practice apprenticeship (“acting like a 
lawyer”); and, finally, a normative apprenticeship (professional identity and 
values).274  
Since the publication of the Carnegie Report, a steadily increasing number 
of scholars, especially those working in law school clinics, have explored 
professional identity formation in legal education.275 In fact, the lead author of 
the Carnegie Report has argued that this focus on professional identity formation 
is a “harbinger[] of a developing social movement in higher education.”276 
This social movement appears especially strong within some religiously 
affiliated law schools. Within the past five years, three religiously affiliated law 
schools—Regent, Mercer, and St. Thomas (Minnesota)—have held symposia on 
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professional identity formation.277 Moreover, the University of St. Thomas 
School of Law’s Holleran Center is devoted specifically to the question of 
professional identity formation: its mission is to “provide innovative 
interdisciplinary research, curriculum development and programs focusing 
holistically on the formation of both students and practicing professionals into 
ethical leaders in their communities.”278 
A full exploration of the question of professional identity formation is 
beyond the scope of this article. I make only a few tentative points. 
First, the obvious point that should go without saying: a Mercy law school 
must take seriously the professional identity formation of its students. In fact, 
just as Professor Kalscheur argued regarding Jesuit education,279 the first 
responsibility of a Mercy law school is formation.  
Second, professional identity formation at a Mercy law school should 
encompass more than one might typically imagine for lawyer professional 
identity formation. Recall the commitment of a Mercy law school to 
mercifulness, meaning, among other things, to an ethic of care and to the 
restoration to dignity of those whose dignity has been denied.280 These 
commitments suggest that law students formed in this tradition should 
appropriate for themselves identities as reconcilers (not merely competent and 
ethical adversaries), healers, compassionate guides, and defenders of human 
dignity. As Margaret Farley observed, mercy and justice can co-exist; in fact, 
each requires the other.281 
Third, professional identity formation at a Mercy institution should 
encourage students to understand any continuities or tensions between their 
preexisting identities and their developing professional identities. Catherine 
MacAuley’s decision to create a Mercy house didn’t emerge from thin air; 
rather, the seeds for this vocation were planted early in life and were watered 
regularly.282  
Similarly, as part of formation, students should be encouraged to understand 
the ways in which their own wounds and vulnerabilities—their painful 
identifications—have shaped and can inform and enrich their professional 
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identities. Exploration and acknowledgment of wounds as part of professional 
identity formation is derived directly from the life of Catherine MacAuley: her 
deepest wound and her strong identification with the most vulnerable in 
society—destitute women and children—combined with her gifts to create an 
authentic and powerful vocation. 
To be clear, I’m not proposing a law school model that encourages students 
to hold hands, cry, and sing kumbaya. I know better and would hate it myself. 
However, I also know of the anxiety, depression, and substance abuse endemic 
within the legal profession, beginning with law students;283 the legal culture that 
extols strength and control while denying vulnerability and pain; and the 
relationship between legal culture’s obsession with strength and the very real 
anxiety, depression, and social isolation of individual lawyers. Unlike the 
professions of social work, clinical psychology, and ministry,284 the legal 
profession has not yet fully acknowledged the generative potential of wounds, 
pain, and vulnerability. Although it’s not clear what this would look like in the 
context of professional identity formation within law schools, this is one 
contribution a Mercy law school might make to the broader profession. We are 
all wounded in some respects, and we all suffer. Even we lawyers can use our 
own suffering to help others. Even lawyers can embody mercy. 
CONCLUSION 
The journey ends where it began, with questions of identity. Seeing us, 
would Mary Scullion recognize us? Would Margaret Farley? Catherine 
McAuley? If our commitment to women and girls is both clear and sophisticated, 
and if we are people of mercy, then the education we provide will itself be a 
work of mercy to our students and to the clients they later serve. 
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